State v. Michael Wiggs

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Michael Wiggs, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001849

Appeal From Beaufort County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-433
Submitted November 1, 2022 – Filed December 7, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael Wiggs appeals his conviction and seven-year sentence
of imprisonment for assault and battery in the first-degree. On appeal, he argues
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a statement he asserts was
involuntary because he was improperly induced into making it by a police officer's
misrepresentation of law.

We hold the trial court did not err by denying Wiggs's motion to suppress. See
State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 378, 652 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) ("On
appeal, the conclusion of the trial [court] as to the voluntariness of a statement will
not be reversed unless so erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion."); id. at
378-79, 652 S.E.2d at 448 ("[T]he appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts
based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines
whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."). The record
contains evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Wiggs's statement was
voluntary, such as the short duration of the interview, the testimony of the
investigator stating Wiggs was not coerced or threatened, Wiggs not being in
custody during the interview and being free to leave afterwards, and the fact that he
did not confess after the investigator's comments implied the penalties for
consensual sex and rape of a minor differed. Thus, we affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 513,
702 S.E.2d 395, 401 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In South Carolina, the test for determining
whether a defendant's confession was given freely, knowingly, and voluntarily
focuses upon whether the defendant's will was overborne by the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the confession."); Miller, 375 S.C. at 386, 652 S.E.2d at
452 ("Appellate entities in South Carolina have recognized that appropriate factors
to consider in the totality-of-circumstances analysis include: background,
experience, and conduct of the accused; age; length of custody; police
misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; threats of violence;
and promises of leniency."); id. at 386, 652 S.E.2d at 452 ("A statement may not be
'extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, [or] obtained by the exertion of improper influence.'"
(quoting State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200, 391 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1990))); State
v. Peake, 291 S.C. 138, 139, 352 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1987) ("A statement induced by
a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to
be a consequence of the promise."); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683
S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Misrepresentations of evidence by police,
although a relevant factor, do not render an otherwise voluntary confession
inadmissible.").

AFFIRMED. 1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.