Lucas Marchant v. John Doe

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lucas Marchant, Respondent,

v.

John Doe and John Doe d/b/a Democrats for Marchant,
Defendants,

Of which John Doe is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001605

Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-413
Submitted October 3, 2022 – Filed November 23, 2022

DISMISSED

Samuel Darryl Harms, III, of Double Aught Injury
Lawyers, LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Joshua Snow Kendrick, of Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of
Greenville, and Christopher Shannon Leonard, of
Kendrick & Leonard, P.C., of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this defamation action filed by Lucas Marchant against John
Doe and John Doe d/b/a Democrats for Marchant, Doe appeals, arguing the circuit
court erred in (1) finding it had subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failing to find his
speech is protected by the federal and state constitutions; (3) denying his motion to
dismiss; (4) denying his motion for a protective order; and (5) denying his motion
to quash a subpoena. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory and not immediately
appealable.

In conjunction with filing an answer in this case, Doe, claiming a right to
anonymity based on political speech, filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to
quash and for a protective order. After a hearing on the motions, the circuit court
found it had jurisdiction over Doe and subject matter jurisdiction. The court
denied the motions to dismiss, for a protective order, and to quash the subpoena.
We dismiss, finding the order is not immediately appealable. See Allison v. W.L.
Gore & Assocs., 394 S.C. 185, 188, 714 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2011) (finding an order
denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not directly
appealable); Mid-State Distribs., Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330,
336, 426 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1993) (explaining an order denying a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction "is interlocutory and not directly appealable");
Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 377 S.C. 12, 30, 659 S.E.2d 112, 122 (2008) (explaining
that "discovery orders, in general, are interlocutory and are not immediately
appealable"); Tucker v. Honda of S.C. Mfg., Inc., 354 S.C. 574, 577, 582 S.E.2d
405, 407 (2003) (holding an order compelling discovery involving privileged
information is not immediately appealable); Waddell v. Kahdy, 309 S.C. 1, 4, 419
S.E.2d 783, 785 (1992) (explaining an order requiring a party to submit to a
deposition is not immediately appealable); Ex parte Whetstone, 289 S.C. 580, 580,
347 S.E.2d 881, 881 (1986) (applying the same rule to a non-party).

In this case, the merits of the lawsuit concern whether Doe defamed Marchant.
Although Doe has a substantial right in anonymous political speech, the order does
not prevent a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. See Laura Rogal,
Anonymity in Social Media, 7 Phoenix L. Rev. 61, 66–67 (2013) ("Although the
courts readily uphold the right to speak anonymously, the right to do so is not
absolute. . . . [I]t is no surprise that political speech receives the highest level of
protection. . . . [However, t]ypes of speech such as defamation, obscenity, and
fighting words remain completely unprotected."); id. at 67 ("In the context of a
conflict between anonymous authors' First Amendment rights and the ability of tort
victims to unmask anonymous speakers, courts have engaged in a wary balancing
act between the two interests . . . . As a result, the identity of an anonymous
speaker may be disclosed during discovery to protect a litigant's legitimate interest
in vindicating a legal right in court.").

DISMISSED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.