R. Jay Lagroon v. Crystal Suggs

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

R. Jay Lagroon, Appellant,

v.

Crystal Suggs and Scott Suggs, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002018

Appeal From McCormick County
J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Debra R. McCaslin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-335
Submitted June 1, 2022 – Filed August 10, 2022

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART

R. Jay Lagroon, of McCormick, pro se.

Billy J. Garrett, Jr., of The Garrett Law Firm, PC, of
Greenwood, for Respondent Crystal Suggs.

Robert Jamison Tinsley, Jr., of Greenwood, for
Respondent Scott Suggs.

PER CURIAM: In this consolidated appeal, R. Jay Lagroon appeals two orders
of the circuit court—one dismissing his causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) and civil conspiracy and one granting Crystal and Scott
Suggs' (the Suggses) joint motion to compel discovery. On appeal, Lagroon argues
the circuit court erred in granting the Suggses' motions to dismiss the IIED and
civil conspiracy claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, and in granting the
Suggses' motion to compel and awarding them $500 in costs. We affirm in part
and dismiss in part pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. We hold the circuit court properly dismissed Lagroon's cause of action for IIED.
See Ashley River Properties I, LLC v. Ashley River Properties II, LLC, 374 S.C.
271, 277, 648 S.E.2d 295, 298 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a
defendant may move for dismissal based on a failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action."); id. ("Generally, in considering a 12(b)(6) motion,
the trial court must base its ruling solely upon allegations set forth on the face of
the complaint." (quoting Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 469, 605 S.E.2d 556, 559
(Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390 (2007))); id. at 278, 648 S.E.2d at 298 ("In
deciding whether the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss, this court
must consider whether the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, states any valid claim for relief." (quoting Flateau v. Harrleson, 355 S.C.
197, 202, 584 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ct. App. 2003))); id. ("A motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted if facts alleged and inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the
case."); Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C., 374 S.C. 352, 356, 650 S.E.2d 68, 70
(2007) (explaining that in order to state a claim for IIED, the party must establish
"(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress, or
was certain, or substantially certain, that such distress would result from his
conduct; (2) the conduct was so 'extreme and outrageous' so as to exceed 'all
possible bounds of decency' and must be regarded as 'atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community;' (3) the actions of the defendant caused
plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff
was 'severe' such that 'no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.'" (quoting
Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 162, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1981))); Upchurch v.
N.Y. Times Co., 314 S.C. 531, 536, 431 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1993) ("It is not enough
that the conduct is intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the
plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.");
Hansson, 374 S.C. at 358, 650 S.E.2d at 72 ("Under the heightened standard of
proof for emotional distress claims . . . , a party cannot establish a prima facie
claim for damages resulting from a defendant's tortious conduct with mere bald
assertions."); id. ("To permit a plaintiff to legitimately state a cause of action by
simply alleging, 'I suffered emotional distress' would be irreconcilable with . . . the
law in this area.").
Additionally, Lagroon's argument that the circuit court erred in failing to convert
the Suggses' motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment is not preserved
for appellate review because Lagroon raised it for the first time in his reply brief.
See State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 410, 411, 401 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1991) ("Generally,
this [c]ourt will not consider issues not raised to or ruled upon by the trial
[court]."); Bochette v. Bochette, 300 S.C. 109, 112, 386 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App.
1989) ("An appellant may not use . . . the reply brief as a vehicle to argue issues
not argued in the appellant's brief.").

2. We hold the circuit court properly dismissed Lagroon's cause of action for civil
conspiracy. See Ashley River Properties, 374 S.C. at 277, 648 S.E.2d at 298
("Under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a defendant may move for dismissal based on a
failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."); id. ("Generally, in
considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court must base its ruling solely upon
allegations set forth on the face of the complaint." (quoting Marion, 361 S.C. at
469, 605 S.E.2d at 559)); id. at 278, 648 S.E.2d at 298 ("In deciding whether the
trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss, this court must consider whether
the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, states any valid
claim for relief." (quoting Flateau, 355 S.C. at 202, 584 S.E.2d at 415)); id. ("A
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted if facts alleged and
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to relief on
any theory of the case."); Paradis v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., 433 S.C. 562,
577, 861 S.E.2d 774, 781 (2021) (overruling the previous civil conspiracy
framework but stating cases on appeal that were decided before Paradis will be
reviewed using the analysis set forth in Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company, 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981), and its
progeny); id. at 573, 861 S.E.2d at 779 (explaining a plaintiff asserting a civil
conspiracy claim under Todd "must allege acts in furtherance of the conspiracy"
separate and distinct from the acts supporting other causes of action); Todd, 276
S.C. at 293, 278 S.E.2d at 611 ("Where the particular acts charged as a conspiracy
are the same as those relied on as the tortious act or actionable wrong, plaintiff
cannot recover damages for such act or wrong, and recover likewise on the
conspiracy to do the act or wrong.").

3. We hold the issue of whether the circuit court abused its discretion by granting
the Suggses' motion to compel and awarding $500 in costs is not appealable
because the order is interlocutory. See Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 377 S.C. 12, 30,
659 S.E.2d 112, 122 (2008) ("[D]iscovery orders, in general, are interlocutory and
are not immediately appealable because they do not, within the meaning of the
appealability statute, involve the merits of the action or affect a substantial right.").
We therefore dismiss the appeal as to this issue.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.