McDew v. McDew

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Stephanie M. McDew a/k/a Stephanie McDew
Schoumacher, Appellant,

v.

Frieda P. McDew a/k/a Frieda McDew Shorter,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002079

Appeal From Beaufort County
Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity and Special
Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-258
Submitted May 1, 2022 – Filed June 8, 2022

AFFIRMED

Stephanie M. McDew, of Washington D.C., pro se.

Thomas J. Finn, of Finn Law Firm, PC, of Hilton Head
Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this dispute between cotenants of a beach house and property
on Hilton Head Island, Appellant Stephanie Schoumacher appeals the
master-in-equity's order, arguing the master erred by (1) finding she failed to prove
her claim for ouster and (2) incorrectly calculating the damages award to
Respondent Frieda Shorter. We affirm.

1. The master did not err by failing to find that Schoumacher was entitled to a
finding of ouster as a matter of law. See Miller v. Dillon, 432 S.C. 197, 206, 851
S.E.2d 462, 467 (Ct. App. 2020) ("On appeal from an action in equity, [the
appellate court] may find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of
the evidence." (quoting Walker v. Brooks, 414 S.C. 343, 347, 778 S.E.2d 477, 479
(2015))); Parker v. Shecut, 359 S.C. 143, 149, 597 S.E.2d 793, 797 (2004)
(indicating a claim for ouster is an equitable claim). Because the master correctly
concluded that Shorter did not exclude Schoumacher from the property, Shorter's
failed adverse possession claim was insufficient to establish ouster as a matter of
law. See Freeman v. Freeman, 323 S.C. 95, 99, 473 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ct. App.
1996) ("'Ouster' is the actual turning out or keeping excluded a party entitled to
possession of any real property.").

Additionally, because there is no evidence in the record indicating when Shorter
changed the locks, Schoumacher cannot show that the alleged newly discovered
evidence "could not have been discovered before trial." See Morin v. Innegrity,
LLC, 424 S.C. 559, 578, 819 S.E.2d 131, 141 (Ct. App. 2018) ("Rule 60(b)(2),
SCRCP, empowers a trial court to grant a new trial . . . if a party establishes the
newly discovered evidence: '(1) will probably change the result if a new trial is
granted; (2) has been discovered since the trial; (3) could not have been discovered
before the trial; (4) is material to the issue; and (5) is not merely cumulative or
impeaching.'" (quoting Lanier v. Lanier, 364 S.C. 211, 217, 612 S.E.2d 456, 459
(Ct. App. 2005))).

2. The master did not err in calculating Shorter's damages award because
Schoumacher waived her challenge to the amount of the award when she stipulated
to the amount of Shorter's damages at trial. See State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151,
156-57, 526 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2000) (providing when a party concedes to an issue
at trial and subsequently argues the issue on appeal, the issue is procedurally
barred).

AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.