Merilee Landano v. Norman S. Landano Sr.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Merilee Landano, Respondent,

v.

Norman S. Landano Sr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000036

Appeal From Aiken County
Vicki J. Snelgrove, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-119
Submitted February 1, 2022 – Filed March 23, 2022

AFFIRMED

Jennifer Lynn Mook, of Law Office of Jennifer Mook,
LLC, of Aiken, for Appellant.

Merilee Landano, of Piedmont, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Norman S. Landano, Sr. (Husband) appeals a decree of divorce,
arguing the family court erred in (1) awarding Merilee Landano (Wife) $750 per
month in permanent periodic alimony and (2) granting her forty-five percent of the
marital estate. We affirm.

1. The family court did not err in awarding Wife permanent periodic alimony.
The facts supporting the grant of $750 per month in permanent periodic alimony
are as follows: (1) the couple was married for sixteen years; (2) Wife was
fifty-seven years old at the time of the divorce; (3) Husband's earning ability was
more than double Wife's, and while Wife worked part-time, Husband had no
objection to her work schedule during the marriage and neither party provided
evidence that Wife would be able to find a full-time job with her work experience;
(4) the family court granted Husband fifty-five percent of the marital estate; and
(5) Husband's infidelity caused the breakdown of the marriage. Because Husband
failed to show the family court's findings were not supported by a preponderance
of the evidence, we affirm. See Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d
486, 487 (2018) (holding on appeal from the family court, an appellate court
reviews factual and legal issues de novo); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709
S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011) (stating appeals from the family court are reviewed de
novo and the appellant bears the burden of proving the family court erred or its
findings are not supported by the preponderance of the evidence); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-3-130(C) (2014) (providing the factors a court should consider in making an
award of alimony include: "(1) the duration of the marriage together with the ages
of the parties at the time of the marriage and at the time of the divorce . . . ; (2) the
physical and emotional condition of each spouse; (3) the educational background
of each spouse . . . ; (4) the employment history and earning potential of each
spouse; (5) the standard of living established during the marriage; (6) the current
and reasonably anticipated earnings of both spouses; (7) the current and reasonably
anticipated expenses and needs of both spouses; (8) the marital and nonmarital
properties of the parties, including those apportioned to him or her in the divorce
. . . ; (9) custody of the children . . . ; (10) marital misconduct or fault of either or
both parties . . . ; (11) the tax consequences to each party as a result of the
particular form of support awarded; (12) the existence and extent of any support
obligation from a prior marriage or for any other reason of either party; and (13)
such other factors the court considers relevant"); Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258, 267,
631 S.E.2d 279, 284 (Ct. App. 2006) (providing that when a court is considering an
alimony award, "[n]o one factor is dispositive" (quoting Allen v. Allen, 347 S.C.
177, 184, 554 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ct. App. 2001))); Craig v. Craig, 365 S.C. 285,
292, 617 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2005) ("Generally, alimony should place the supported
spouse, as nearly as practical, in the same position as enjoyed during the
marriage.").

2. The family court did not err in granting Wife forty-five percent of the marital
estate—which consisted of ten acres of land and two homes on the property—
because the record shows the overall apportionment was equitable and fair. The
family court considered the following: (1) Husband transferred the property to
Wife soon after the marriage; (2) Wife contributed financially to improvements on
the property; (3) Wife contributed toward insurance and taxes on the property and
made all but two-and-one-half of the insurance payments following the parties'
separation; (4) Wife handled the rental property and tenant issues for
approximately five years; (5) the parties resided in both the home and mobile home
during the marriage; and (6) Husband owned the property prior to the marriage.
See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 596, 813 S.E.2d at 487 ("[T]he proper standard of review in
family court matters is de novo . . . ."); Brown v. Brown, 412 S.C. 225, 235, 771
S.E.2d 649, 654 (Ct. App. 2015) ("In reviewing a division of marital property, an
appellate court looks to the overall fairness of the apportionment."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-3-620(B) (2014) (providing fifteen factors the family court must weigh
when apportioning a marital estate).

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.