Young v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jakarta Deshon Young, #276572, Respondent,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001293

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Harold W. Funderburk, Jr., Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-447
Heard November 02, 2021 – Filed December 15, 2021

REVERSED

Christina Catoe Bigelow and Kensey Barrett, both of
South Carolina Department of Corrections, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Blake Terence Williams, of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia, and Appellate Defender
Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Appellant South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC)
challenges an order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) ruling that Respondent
Jakarta Young's drug trafficking conviction under S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e)(2)
(2018) is one that is eligible for parole, extended work release, or supervised
furlough. We reverse the ALC's order.

FACTS

On August 25, 2016, Young was sentenced to seven years for the offense of
trafficking in cocaine (10 grams), second offense, in violation of section 44-53-
370(e)(2). On May 16, 2017, Young was sentenced to eight years for the offense of
manufacturing cocaine base, second offense, in violation of section 44-53-375(B)(2)
(2018). The latter sentence was to run concurrently with the August 25, 2016
sentence for trafficking in cocaine.

Young filed two consecutive grievances challenging SCDC's sentencing
calculation, both alleging that his offense of trafficking in cocaine (10 grams),
second offense, is no longer a "no parole" offense under state law. The Warden
denied both grievances, finding that the offense of trafficking in cocaine under
section 44-53-370(e)(2) requires a "no parole (85 percent) sentence." Young then
filed a notice of appeal to the ALC, in which he repeated his argument from his
previous grievances. On June 20, 2018, the Honorable H.W. Funderburk Jr. ruled
that Young was eligible for parole, extended work release, or supervised furlough
under section 44-53-370 and issued an order reversing SCDC's decision and
remanding the case to SCDC. This appeal followed.

ISSUE

Did the ALC improperly rule that Young's drug trafficking conviction under
section 44-53-370(e)(2) is one that is eligible for parole, extended work release, and
supervised furlough?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) governs the standard of review on
appeal from a decision of the ALC, allowing this court to

reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made
upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by other error of
law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;
or (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2020).

The decision of the ALC should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by
substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law. Olson v. S.C. Dep’t of
Health and Envtl. Control, 379 S.C. 57, 63, 663 S.E.2d 497, 501 (Ct. App. 2008).
The reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
administrative law judge as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." S.C.
Code. Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2020).

ANALYSIS

SCDC argues the ALC improperly ruled that Young's drug trafficking
conviction under section 44-53-370(e)(2) is one that is eligible for parole, extended
work release, and supervised furlough because the offense is a Class A felony; thus,
Young is required under section 24-13-150 (Supp. 2020) to complete at least 85
percent of his sentence before parole eligibility. We agree.

The parties are not in dispute that Young's drug trafficking conviction is
categorized as a Class A felony under section 16-1-90 (Supp. 2020). Absent
statutory language to the contrary, Class A felonies are considered "no parole"
offenses under section 24-13-100 (2007), and subject to the 85 percent requirement
under section 24-13-150.

Section 24-13-150(A) provides that

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except in a
case in which the death penalty or a term of life
imprisonment is imposed, an inmate convicted of a "no
parole offense" as defined in Section 24-13-100 and
sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections,
including an inmate serving time in a local facility
pursuant to a designated facility agreement authorized by
Section 24-3-20 or Section 24-3-30, is not eligible for
early release, discharge, or community supervision as
provided in Section 24-21-560, until the inmate has served
at least eighty-five percent of the actual term of
imprisonment imposed. This percentage must be
calculated without the application of earned work credits,
education credits, or good conduct credits, and is to be
applied to the actual term of imprisonment imposed, not
including any portion of the sentence which has been
suspended. Nothing in this section may be construed to
allow an inmate convicted of murder or an inmate
prohibited from participating in work release, early
release, discharge, or community supervision by another
provision of law to be eligible for work release, early
release, discharge, or community supervision.

(Emphasis added). The "no parole" requirement of section 24-13-150 applies to all
individuals convicted pursuant to section 24-13-100, unless another statute preempts
it.

Young argues that because he was convicted under subsection (e) of section
44-53-370, an unenumerated paragraph in subsection (e) following item (7) exempts
him from the requirement of serving 85 percent of his Class A felony sentence under
section 24-13-150. The unenumerated paragraph provides in pertinent part:

A person convicted and sentenced under this subsection to
a mandatory term of imprisonment of twenty-five years, a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of twenty-five
years, or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of
not less than twenty-five years nor more than thirty years
is not eligible for parole, extended work release, as
provided in Section 24-13-610, or supervised furlough, as
provided in Section 24-13-710.

S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e) (emphases added).

This paragraph sets forth various instances in which parole may not be granted
to an individual convicted under section 44-53-370(e). The unenumerated paragraph
describes conditions for ineligibility, but does not confer eligibility for parole,
extended work release, or supervised furlough. The ALC erroneously read into
section 44-53-370(e) an implicit parole eligibility by interpreting the unenumerated
paragraph as having the effect of preempting any contrary statutory language.
However, had the legislature intended to confer parole eligibility to individuals
sentenced under this section, it would have included a "notwithstanding" clause, as
it did in section 44-53-370(b), which would have preempted the 85 percent
requirement of section 24-13-150. See Bolin v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 415 S.C. 276,
282–83, 781 S.E.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2016) (explaining the effect of the 2010
amendments to sections 44-54-370 and -375 adding the "notwithstanding" clause to
various subsections).

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislative intent whenever possible." Perry v. Bullock, 409 S.C. 137, 140, 761
S.E.2d 251, 253 (2014) (quoting State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 342, 531 S.E.2d
922, 923 (2000)). "Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the province of the court
to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." S.C. Energy Users
Comm. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 388 S.C. 486, 491, 697 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2010).
"Where the statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear, definite
meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no
right to impose another meaning." Id.; see also State v. Johnson, 396 S.C. 182, 188,
720 S.E.2d 516, 519–20 (Ct. App. 2011) (same). "All rules of statutory construction
are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably
discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in light of the
intended purpose of the statute." S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Brock, 410
S.C. 361, 367, 764 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2014) (quoting McClanahan v. Richland Cnty.
Council, 350 S.C. 433, 438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002)). When interpreting the
meaning of a statute, courts will "avoid a reading [that] renders some words
altogether redundant." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995).

Moreover, in interpreting a statute, the court must not look merely at a
"particular clause in which a word may be used, but rather looks at the word and its
meaning in conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute, and in light of the
object and policy of the law." S.C. Coastal Council v. S.C. State Ethics Comm'n,
306 S.C. 41, 44, 410 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing Spartanburg
Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. City of Spartanburg, 283 S.C. 67, 321 S.E.2d 258 (1984)).
See also Centex Int'l, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 406 S.C. 132, 139, 750 S.E.2d
65, 69 (2013) ("In interpreting a statute, '[w]ords must be given their plain and
ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand
the statute's operation.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C.
495, 499, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007))); id. ("Further, 'the statute must be read as a
whole and sections which are a part of the same general statutory law must be
construed together and each one given effect.'" (emphasis added) (quoting S.C. State
Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cnty., 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006))); id.
("Accordingly, we 'read the statute as a whole' and 'should not concentrate on
isolated phrases within the statute.'" (quoting CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cnty.
Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011))).

Items (1) and (2) of section 44-53-370(b) both deal with offenses involving
multiple types of illicit substances, including cocaine. They both contain
"notwithstanding" clauses that expressly exempt individuals convicted under those
subsections from the 85 percent requirement in section 24-13-150. Had Young been
convicted under section 44-53-370(b)(2), he would be eligible for parole, extended
work release, or supervised furlough due to the "notwithstanding" clause, which
would preempt the 85 percent requirement in section 24-13-150. However, because
Young was sentenced under section 44-53-370(e)(2), a provision which does not
contain a "notwithstanding" clause, he is not eligible for parole, extended work
release, or supervised furlough until he has completed at least 85 percent of his
sentence. The General Assembly clearly intended for only those individuals
sentenced under sections 44-53-370(b)(1)–(2) to be eligible for parole, extended
work release, and supervised furlough notwithstanding section 24-13-150. Due to
the General Assembly's decision not to include similar "notwithstanding" language
in section 44-53-370(e), it is reasonable to conclude that parole eligibility under
subsection (e) is dictated by the 85 percent requirement in section 24-13-150.

Young further argues that this court's language in State v. Taub, buttressed by
the unenumerated paragraph following item (7) in section 44-53-370(e), makes him
eligible for parole, extended work release, or supervised furlough. We disagree.

In Taub, this court stated that an individual sentenced for trafficking in
cocaine under section 44-53-370(e) "as a first or second offender, though subjected
to a required minimum term of imprisonment, is not precluded under the statute
from receiving parole, extended work release, or supervised furlough." State v.
Taub, 336 S.C. 310, 316, 519 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added).
Young argues that this court interpreted the unenumerated paragraph in section 44-
53-370(e) as providing eligibility for parole, extended work release, and supervised
furlough to individuals convicted under section 44-53-370(e) whose sentences did
not meet the criteria for ineligibility set forth in the paragraph. While this court did
reference the parole eligibility for a person sentenced under section 44-53-370(e)(2),
the issue in Taub was not parole eligibility; rather, that case dealt primarily with
issues regarding sentencing under section 44-53-370(e). See generally Taub.

Indeed, the language in Taub concerning parole eligibility does not go as far
as to confer parole eligibility outright to a first or second offender under section 44-
53-370(e)(2). This court stated that an individual sentenced for trafficking in
cocaine under section 44-53-370(e) "as a first or second offender, though subjected
to a required minimum term of imprisonment, is not precluded under the statute
from receiving parole, extended work release, or supervised furlough." 336 S.C. at
316, 519 S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis added). The inclusion of the phrase "under the
statute," means that under only section 44-53-370(e), an individual convicted as a
first or second offender is not precluded from parole eligibility, while still allowing
the possibility for another statute (such as section 24-13-150) to restrict such
eligibility. See id. Therefore, the applicability of the parole eligibility restrictions
of section 24-13-150 on Young's conviction does not violate this court's ruling in
Taub.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ALC incorrectly ruled that Young is
eligible for parole, extended work release, or supervised furlough under section 44-
53-370(e). Therefore, the order of the ALC is

REVERSED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.