State v. Jones

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Bobby Jones, Sr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001345

Appeal From Allendale County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-258
Heard March 4, 2021 – Filed July 7, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Adam Sinclair Ruffin, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Bobby Jones, Jr. appeals his conviction for criminal sexual
conduct (CSC) with a minor, second degree. Jones argues the trial court erred in
(1) finding he violated Batson v. Kentucky1 through his use of peremptory
challenges and quashing the jury and (2) qualifying the State's witness as an expert
in child sex abuse dynamics. We affirm.

1. We find the trial court did not err in finding a Batson violation and quashing the
jury. See State v. Inman, 409 S.C. 19, 25, 760 S.E.2d 105, 108 (2014) ("In
criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." (quoting State
v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001))); see also McCrea v.
Gheraibeh, 380 S.C. 183, 186, 669 S.E.2d 333, 334 (2008) ("The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the striking of a venire person on the basis of race or gender."). Batson challenges
follow a three-step process: (1) the opponent of the challenge makes a prima facie
showing that the challenge was based on race, (2) the proponent of the challenge
must provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenge, and (3) the opponent of
the challenge must demonstrate that the given reason was pretext by proving
purposeful discrimination. State v. Giles, 407 S.C. 14, 18, 754 S.E.2d 261, 263
(2014). The explanation provided by the proponent of the challenge does not have
to be persuasive or even plausible, but it must be "clear and reasonably specific" to
allow the opponent of the strike a chance to show pretext and to allow the court to
evaluate the strike. Id. at 21–22, 754 S.E.2d at 265. Purposeful discrimination
may be proven by showing the proponent did not strike similarly situated members
of a different class or that the proponent's reason is "so fundamentally implausible
as to constitute mere pretext despite a lack of disparate treatment." State v. Ford,
334 S.C. 59, 64, 512 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1999). "The ultimate burden always rests
with the opponent of the challenge to prove purposeful discrimination." Giles, 407
S.C. at 18, 754 S.E.2d at 263. "Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be
determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."
State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 615, 545 S.E.2d 805, 810 (2001). "The trial [court's]
findings of purposeful discrimination rest largely on [its] evaluation of demeanor
and credibility." Id. Accordingly, "[t]he trial court's findings regarding purposeful
discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if
clearly erroneous." Inman, 409 S.C. at 25, 760 S.E.2d at 108 (quoting State v.
Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 630, 515 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1999)).

In this case, Jones used three challenges to strike the only three Caucasian
individuals selected for the jury, and the State argued this was a Batson violation.
During his explanation, Jones stated he struck one particular juror because of her
occupation as a "housewife." The court asked Jones to explain the rationale for

1
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
striking a housewife, and Jones stated he struck her for her occupation. The State
argued striking the juror because she was a housewife was not relevant to the facts
of the case and therefore was not a sufficient race-neutral reason. The court asked
Jones to explain why the juror's occupation as a housewife was objectionable,2 and
Jones said it was because housewives manage households and make purposeful
decisions. The court heard further arguments from both sides and ultimately found
Jones's challenge was a Batson violation. Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that, although the trial court did not neatly divide the Batson hearing into
the three steps, the requirements were met: the State made a prima facie showing
of a Batson violation, Jones offered an explanation, and the court, considering the
totality of the circumstances and assessing the credibility and believability of each
side, was persuaded by the State's argument. See Shuler, 344 S.C. at 615, 545
S.E.2d at 810 ("Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by
examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."); id. ("The trial
[court's] findings of purposeful discrimination rest largely on [its] evaluation of
demeanor and credibility."). Accordingly, we affirm on this issue. See Inman, 409
S.C. at 25, 760 S.E.2d at 108 ("The trial court's findings regarding purposeful
discrimination are accorded great deference and will be set aside on appeal only if
clearly erroneous." (quoting Haigler, 334 S.C. at 630, 515 S.E.2d at 91)).

2. We find the trial court did not err in allowing Sitha Patel to testify as an expert
in child sexual abuse dynamics. "[T]he law in South Carolina is settled: behavioral
characteristics of sex abuse victims is an area of specialized knowledge where
expert testimony may be utilized." State v. Jones, 423 S.C. 631, 636, 817 S.E.2d
268, 271 (2018). Testimony regarding the behavioral characteristics of child sex

2
Jones argues the trial court's request that he explain his reasoning amounted to
burden shifting. We disagree as the record indicates the court asked why
housewives were objectionable in order to provide a fair opportunity for the State
to argue it was pretext and the court to evaluate it. See Giles, 407 S.C. at 21–22,
754 S.E.2d at 265 (stating that explanation provided by the proponent of the
challenge does not have to be persuasive or even plausible, but it must be "clear
and reasonably specific" to allow the opponent of the strike a chance to show
pretext and to allow the court to evaluate the strike); id. at 22, 754 S.E.2d at 265
("Reasonable specificity is necessary because comparison to other members of the
venire for purposes of a disparate treatment analysis, which is often used at the
third step of the Batson process to determine if purposeful discrimination has
occurred, is impossible if the proponent of the challenge provides only a vague or
very general explanation.").
abuse victims is nonscientific and governed by State v. White.3 State v. Chavis,
412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2015). Under White, a witness may be
designated as an expert if the court determines the witness is sufficiently qualified
and his or her testimony is reliable. Id. at 106–07, 771 S.E.2d at 339. The court
must also find that the evidence is admissible. State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 388,
728 S.E.2d 468, 474–75 (2012) ("The expertise, reliability, and the ability of the
testimony to assist the trier of fact are all threshold determinations to be made prior
to the admission of expert testimony."). Whether an expert is qualified and the
expert's testimony is reliable and admissible is within the trial court's discretion
and will not be reversed absent a prejudicial abuse of that discretion. Chavis, 412
S.C. at 106, 771 S.E.2d at 338. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the
conclusions of the circuit court are either controlled by an error of law or are based
on unsupported factual conclusions." Id.

First, Jones argues Patel was not sufficiently qualified. We disagree. See Rule
702, SCRE (stating a witness may be an expert due to his or her knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education); State v. Schumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 505, 435
S.E.2d 859, 861 (1993) ("The qualification of a witness as an expert falls largely
within the trial [court's] discretion."), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016). Patel had a master's degree in social
work, was trained in trauma-focused therapy, and was certified as a master social
worker and forensic interviewer. Additionally, Patel took continuing education
courses, had given multiple presentations, had conducted over four hundred fifty
forensic interviews, and had counseled approximately one hundred thirty children.
Although Jones takes issue with the quality of Patel's education and the process for
her certifications, these considerations go to the weight of her testimony and not
whether she was sufficiently qualified. See State v. Peer, 320 S.C. 546, 549,
554–55, 466 S.E.2d 375, 377, 380–81 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) (finding the
trial court did not err in qualifying a witness as an expert because the witness,
despite not having any formal training, demonstrated sufficient knowledge and
experience). Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding Patel was qualified. See Schumpert, 312 S.C. at 505–06, 435 S.E.2d at 861
(stating the expert was qualified to testify about rape trauma syndrome when she
held a master's degree in social work, attended training seminars regarding the
subject matter, and had been involved in more than one hundred cases involving
sexually abused children).

3
382 S.C. 265, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009).
Next, Jones argues Patel was not reliable. We disagree. See Chavis, 412 S.C. at
108, 771 S.E.2d at 339 ("There is no formulaic approach for determining the
foundational requirements of qualifications and reliability in non[]scientific
evidence."); Tapp, 398 S.C. at 388, 728 S.E.2d at 474 ("[A]ll expert testimony, not
just scientific expert testimony, must be vetted for its reliability prior to its
admission at trial."). Jones contends this case is analogous to Chavis, in which our
supreme court held the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify as an expert
that a disclosure of abuse had been made. See 412 S.C. at 107–08, 771 S.E.2d at
339 (finding the State failed to show the expert's testimony was reliable because
she could not provide an error rate, her peer review was another interviewer
reviewing her work to ensure she was using the proper protocol, and her quality
control procedures were consistently using the particular protocol). However,
Chavis is distinguishable because Patel was not qualified as a forensic interviewer
and did not testify about whether, under a particular protocol, the victim made a
disclosure of abuse by Jones. Instead, Patel was qualified as an expert in sexual
abuse dynamics and testified in general terms about concepts such as family
dynamics, grooming, the disclosure process, and recantation. See State v. Jones,
417 S.C. 319, 332, 790 S.E.2d 17, 24 (Ct. App. 2016) (finding the trial court
properly determined the expert's reliability and distinguishing Chavis because the
expert was not testifying as an expert forensic interviewer but was testifying in
general terms about certain concepts of child sexual abuse). Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in allowing Patel to testify as an expert, and we affirm on this
issue.

Based on the foregoing, Jones's conviction is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.