State v. Webb

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jeremy Renard Webb, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-002131

Appeal From Pickens County
R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-159
Submitted April 1, 2021 – Filed May 5, 2021

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia, and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville; all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jeremy Renard Webb appeals his conviction for breaking and
entering a motor vehicle, arguing the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he
had broken into another automobile several years earlier. We reverse and remand.1

On December 21, 2017, the victim's surveillance footage showed someone
approaching his car at 12:50 a.m., opening the door, and entering the vehicle.
Nothing was taken from the car, and the victim saw the suspect only on camera.
After viewing the footage of the incident, the detective assigned to the case
identified Webb as the suspect.

At Webb's trial, the State moved to admit evidence of a 2014 incident in which
Webb had broken into another automobile that was parked at a residence. In
support of the motion, the State asserted both incidents occurred at night and
involved vehicles parked at residences that were about two miles from each other.
The State argued that based on these similarities, the evidence was admissible
under Rule 404(b), SCRE, to show the existence of a common scheme or plan.
Over Webb's objection, the trial court ruled the evidence was admissible.

On appeal, Webb argues the prior incident did not qualify for admission under the
common scheme or plan exception to the prohibition of prior bad act evidence.
We agree.2 There was no showing of any logical relation between the 2014
incident and the 2017 incident. See State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 44, 842 S.E.2d
654, 665 (2020) (holding the State must demonstrate to the trial court that there is
in fact a scheme or plan common to both the prior bad act and the crime for which
the defendant is standing trial and that evidence about the prior bad act "serves
some purpose other than using the defendant's character to show his propensity to
commit the crime charged"); State v. Clasby, 385 S.C. 148, 155, 682 S.E.2d 892,
895 (2009) (stating that to be admissible against a defendant in a criminal case, a
prior "bad act must logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been
charged"). Here, the prior incident occurred more than three years before the
incident that resulted in the current charge against Webb. Furthermore, the
similarities between the two incidents cited by the State at trial, namely, that both

1
We note that according to the South Carolina Department of Corrections
Incarcerated Inmate Search page, Webb is no longer in custody.
2
In its respondent's brief, the State does not challenge Webb's position that
evidence about the 2014 incident should not have been admitted under the
common scheme or plan exception; rather, it argues only that any error in
admitting this evidence was harmless in light of the evidence produced against
Webb at trial.
incidents occurred at night and at locations within close proximity of each other,
were only general similarities that did not support finding they were part of a
common scheme or plan. See State v. Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 234, 433 S.E.2d 831,
833 (1993) (noting the connection between the prior bad act at issue and the
present charge against the defendant was only "a general similarity" and was "thus
insufficient to support the common scheme or plan exception" and holding "the
admission of the prior incident was, therefore, an evidentiary error").

We further agree with Webb that the error in admitting evidence regarding the
prior incident was not harmless. Considering the relationship of the error to the
entire case, it does not appear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute
to Webb's guilty verdict. See State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 389, 728 S.E.2d 468,
475 (2012) ("The key factor for determining whether a trial error constitutes
reversible error is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."); State v. Mitchell, 286
S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) ("[T]he materiality and prejudicial
character of [an] error [regarding the admission of evidence] must be determined
from its relationship to the entire case.").

First, we note that "[w]hen the prior bad acts are similar to the one for which the
appellant is being tried, the danger of prejudice is enhanced." State v. Brooks, 341
S.C. 57, 62, 533 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2000), quoted in State v. King, 424 S.C. 188,
203, 818 S.E.2d 204, 212 (2018).

Second, the State's evidence against Webb was not overwhelming and consisted
only of the surveillance footage from the 2017 incident, still shots made from the
footage, and the detective's testimony identifying Webb as the person seen on the
footage.3 Law enforcement did not obtain fingerprints or other forensic evidence,
nothing was taken from the vehicle, and Webb was not arrested until almost two
months after the incident and never admitted his involvement. When asked by the
State to describe "identifiable" features in one of the still shots, the detective did
not provide any specific information and answered, "Just, actually his face. Just by
knowing who he is, just knowing [Webb], his face, that's him."

Third, in its closing argument, the State referenced the 2014 incident, reminding
the jury that a witness purportedly testified that "a few years ago, a tall, slender,

3
We reviewed the surveillance footage of the 2017 incident and agree it showed a
person who could have been Webb; however, it did not show the subject had any
distinctive features or mannerisms. The still shots were not provided to this court.
skinny, black male broke in her car." Although the State explained to the jury that
it referenced the prior incident to show how the detective knew Webb, the remark
also emphasized that Webb had previously committed a bad act that was similar to
the crime for which he was currently standing trial.

Considering all these circumstances, we hold the State did not conclusively prove
Webb's guilt such that no other rational conclusion could have been reached. See
State v. Reyes, 432 S.C. 394, 406, 853 S.E.2d 334, 340 (2020) ("In determining
whether error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we often look to whether the
'defendant's guilt has been conclusively proven . . . such that no other rational
conclusion can be reached.'" (quoting State v. Collins, 409 S.C. 524, 538, 763
S.E.2d 22, 29-30 (2014))). Therefore, we hold the trial court committed reversible
error in allowing the State to present evidence about Webb's prior bad act and
remand the matter for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.4

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.