McCauley v. Wickensimer

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lamont Jeremiah McCauley, Appellant,

v.

Paul Wickensimer, Greenville County Family Court
Clerk's Office, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000741

Appeal From Greenville County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-109
Submitted January 1, 2021 – Filed April 7, 2021

AFFIRMED

Lamont Jeremiah McCauley, of Mauldin, pro se.

Russell W. Harter, Jr. and Carly H. Davis, both of
Chapman, Harter & Harter, P.A., of Greenville, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Lamont Jeremiah McCauley appeals the circuit court's order
granting a motion to dismiss filed by the Greenville County Clerk's Office and Paul
Wickensimer, the Greenville County Family Clerk of Court. On appeal, McCauley
contends the circuit court erred by (1) not notifying him the motion to dismiss
would be heard during his motion for a venue change, (2) ignoring evidence that it
had subject matter jurisdiction and should have denied the motion to dismiss, and
(3) hearing arguments presented by the Clerk's office and the Clerk that supported
the motion to dismiss. McCauley did not allege in his complaint that the Clerk's
office and the Clerk did anything beyond filing a foreign support order. Because
all actions alleged in McCauley's complaint fell within the purview of the duties of
the Clerk's office and Clerk, the circuit court properly granted the motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.1 See Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646,
675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) ("On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the
[circuit] court."); Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995)
("The ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the
allegations set forth on the face of the complaint."); Plyler v. Burns, 373 S.C. 637,
645, 647 S.E.2d 188, 192 (2007) ("A 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted if
'facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the
plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case.'" (quoting Onorato, 318 S.C. at
300, 457 S.E.2d at 603)); Rule 12(b)(6) ("[T]he following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action . . . ."); Steinke v. S.C. Dep't
of Labor, Licensing & Reg., 336 S.C. 373, 393, 520 S.E.2d 142, 152 (1999) ("The
South Carolina Tort Claims Act, which provides the exclusive remedy in tort
against [the Clerk and the Clerk's Office], is a limited waiver of governmental
immunity."); S.C. Code Ann § 15-78-40 (2005); ("The State, an agency, a political
subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to
the limitations upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and
damages, contained herein."); Steinke, 336 S.C. at 393, 520 S.E.2d at 152. ("The
burden of establishing a limitation upon liability or an exception to the waiver of
immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act is upon the governmental
entity asserting it as an affirmative defense."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(1) to
(5), (23) (2005) ("The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from:

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (2005 & Supp. 2020). McCauley's
allegation that he did not receive notice regarding the motion to dismiss being
heard during his motion for a venue change was not preserved. See Wilder Corp.
V. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) (“It is axiomatic that an
issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and
ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.").
(1) legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial action or inaction; (2) administrative
action or inaction of a legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial nature; (3) execution,
enforcement, or implementation of the orders of any court or execution,
enforcement, or lawful implementation of any process; (4) adoption, enforcement,
or compliance with any law or failure to adopt or enforce any law, whether valid or
invalid, including, but not limited to, any charter, provision, ordinance, resolution,
rule, regulation, or written policies; (5) the exercise of discretion or judgment by
the governmental entity or employee or the performance or failure to perform any
act or service which is in the discretion or judgment of the government entity or
employee; [or] . . . (23) institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding . . . .").2

AFFIRMED.3

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

2
Because the circuit court properly dismissed McCauley's complaint under the
South Carolina Tort Claims Act, we need not address any remaining issues.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address remaining
issues on appeal when the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.