State v. Ancrum

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Derrick Jermaine Ancrum, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000586

Appeal From Charleston County
Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-017
Submitted November 1, 2020 – Filed January 27, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William Frederick Schumacher, IV,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Derrick Jermaine Ancrum appeals his convictions for trafficking
cocaine, trafficking crack cocaine, and manufacturing crack cocaine. On appeal,
Ancrum argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized during the execution of a search warrant because the affidavit in support of
the search warrant failed to set forth a substantial basis for probable cause.

The affidavit provided the following information: Detective Leon Forrest, an
undercover officer, solicited Bernard Barnwell for crack cocaine; Barnwell
informed Detective Forrest he could acquire crack cocaine; in Detective Forrest's
presence, Barnwell called an unknown individual and inquired about crack
cocaine; Detective Forrest overheard the conversation and heard the unknown
individual confirm he had crack cocaine; Barnwell ended the call and left to
retrieve the crack cocaine; Detective Patrick Gill, who was working in conjunction
with Detective Forrest and Detective Jason Scurry, observed Barnwell participate
in what appeared to be a hand-to-hand exchange with an unidentified individual in
the front doorway of a residence; and after the exchange, Barnwell immediately
returned to Detective Forrest and gave him crack cocaine. Because the affidavit
contained sufficient underlying facts for the magistrate court to determine probable
cause existed, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Dupree, 354 S.C. 676, 683, 583 S.E.2d 437, 441 (Ct. App.
2003) ("An appellate court reviewing the decision to issue a search warrant should
decide whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable
cause existed."); State v. Jones, 342 S.C. 121, 126, 536 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2000)
("When reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, [an appellate
court] must consider the totality of the circumstances."); State v. Weston, 329 S.C.
287, 290, 494 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1997) ("A reviewing court should give great
deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause."); State v. Baccus, 367
S.C. 41, 50, 625 S.E.2d 216, 221 (2006) (determining a warrant is supported by
probable cause if, given the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit,
"there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))); Dupree,
354 S.C. at 684, 583 S.E.2d at 441 ("The affidavit must contain sufficient
underlying facts and information upon which the magistrate may make a
determination of probable cause. The magistrate should determine probable cause
based on all of the information available to the magistrate at the time the warrant
was issued." (citation omitted)); State v. Gentile, 373 S.C. 506, 514-16, 646 S.E.2d
171, 175-76 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding a search warrant affidavit and a police
officer's supplemental testimony were insufficient to establish probable cause
because the officer did not conduct an additional investigation after verifying
civilian complaints and was unable to verify whether a visitor to the residence had
drugs on his person before entering the residence); State v. Philpot, 317 S.C. 458,
461, 454 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding a search warrant affidavit was
not supported by probable cause because the officer had no first-hand knowledge
and the officer did not show the confidential informant was reliable).

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.