Pressley v. SCDOT

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jerry Pressley, Appellant,

v.

The South Carolina Department of Transportation,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001093

Appeal From Williamsburg County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-187
Submitted May 1, 2020 – Filed June 17, 2020

AFFIRMED

Raymond Carl Fischer and William Stuart Duncan, both
of Law Offices of William Stuart Duncan, PA, of
Georgetown, for Appellant.

William Grayson Lambert, of Burr & Forman, LLP, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jerry Pressley appeals the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment to the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT). The
circuit court determined SCDOT was entitled to immunity under the South
Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (2005 & Supp.
2019), because (1) SCDOT lacked actual or constructive notice under section
15-78-60(15) and (2) the washout was a temporary or natural condition due to
weather under section 15-78-60(8). On appeal, Pressley argues the circuit court
erred in (1) finding SCDOT did not have actual or constructive notice of the
washout and (2) finding the washout was a natural or temporary condition. We
affirm.

1. The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to SCDOT because
SCDOT did not have actual or constructive notice, and thus was entitled to
immunity under section 15-78-60(15). See S. Glass & Plastics Co., Inc. v.
Kemper, 399 S.C. 483, 490, 732 S.E.2d 205, 208-09 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When
reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same
standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment
is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id. at 490, 732 S.E.2d at 209 ("In
determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party."); § 15-78-60(15) (providing immunity to entities of the state
government "responsible for maintaining highways, roads, streets, causeways,
bridges, or other public ways" when loss results from a "defect or . . . condition in,
on, under, or overhanging a highway, road, street, causeway, bridge, or other
public way caused by a third party" provided "the defect or condition
is . . . corrected by the particular governmental entity responsible for the
maintenance within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice"); Spence
v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 118, 628 S.E.2d 869, 875 (2006) ("Generally, actual
notice is synonymous with knowledge." (quoting Strother v. Lexington County
Recreation Commn., 332 S.C. 54, 64 n.6, 504 S.E.2d 117, 122 n.6 (1998))); Major
v. City of Hartsville, 410 S.C. 1, 3-4, 763 S.E.2d 348, 350 (2014) (explaining
constructive notice in the context of public entities and personal injury cases arises
"when a condition has existed for such a period of time that a [public entity] in the
use of reasonable care should have discovered the condition" (quoting Fickling v.
City of Charleston, 372 S.C. 597, 609-10 n.34, 643 S.E.2d 110, 117 n.34 (Ct. App.
2007))).

2. The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to SCDOT because
SCDOT was entitled to immunity under section 15-78-60(8) of the South Carolina
Code. See S. Glass & Plastics Co., Inc., 399 S.C. at 490, 732 S.E.2d at 208-09
("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the
same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id. at 490, 732 S.E2d at
209 ("In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party."); § 15-78-60(8) (explaining a state entity is immune from
suit when the plaintiff's loss is caused by "snow or ice conditions or temporary or
natural conditions on any public way or other public place due to weather
conditions unless the snow or ice thereon is affirmatively caused by a negligent act
of the employee" (emphasis added)); Lightner v. Hampton Hall Club, Inc., 419
S.C. 357, 363, 798 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2017) ("The cardinal rule of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever
possible." (quoting Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 411 S.C. 632, 634, 770 S.E.2d
391, 392 (2015))); Nexsen v. Ward, 96 S.C. 313, 80 S.E. 599, 601 (1914) ("The
rule sustained by all the courts requires that every word, clause, and sentence must
be given some meaning, force, and effect, if it can be done by any reasonable
construction."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)
("Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of
a clear and unambiguous statute."); id. ("Where the statute's language is plain and
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another
meaning.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.