State v. Goodwin

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Antwon Deangelo Goodwin, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000144

Appeal From Charleston County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-191
Submitted May 1, 2020 – Filed June 24, 2020

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Susannah Rawl Cole, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Antwon D. Goodwin appeals the trial court's denial of his Rule
29(a) and (b), SCRCrimP, motion for a new trial. On appeal, Goodwin argues the
trial court erred by (1) finding he did not timely file his Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP,
motion for a new trial, (2) denying trial counsel's motion to be relieved as counsel
during the trial, and (3) admitting evidence trial counsel previously represented
Darrell Royal, one of the State's witnesses. We affirm.

The trial court did not err by denying Goodwin's Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP, motion
on the basis it was untimely filed. See State v. Campbell, 376 S.C. 212, 215, 656
S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) ("It is a long-standing rule of law that a trial judge is
without jurisdiction to consider a criminal matter once the term of court during
which judgment was entered expires."); Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP (permitting
post-trial motions to be made within ten days after the imposition of the sentence).
At the end of his 2003 trial, Goodwin stated, "I have several [m]otions. Can I
reserve that until later, Your Honor?" The trial court replied, "Certainly. I will be
back here two weeks from now. With that said, this case will now be drawn to a
close." Goodwin's sentencing sheet reflected the following special condition:
"[Goodwin's] motions reserved for a later date." Fourteen years later, in March
2017, Goodwin filed a Rule 29(a), SCRCrimP, motion, seeking a new trial.
Although Goodwin contends the trial court reserved its right to rule on his
post-trial motions during this exchange, the trial court could not have reserved a
right to rule on motions that Goodwin never articulated. Goodwin only stated he
had "several [m]otions," and did not further expound on the type or content of the
motions. Thus, the question posed to the trial court only related to the timeframe
in which motions could be brought before it. This interpretation of the exchange
suggests the trial court extended the time for filing post-trial motions, which is
supported by the trial court's January 2018 order.1 See Eddins v. Eddins, 304 S.C.
133, 135, 403 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ct. App. 1991) ("First, in construing an ambiguous
order or decree, the determinative factor is to ascertain the intent of the judge who
wrote the order."); id. at 136, 403 S.E.2d at 166 ("On appeal from an order in
which a judge construes his own previously issued order, this court has jurisdiction
to construe the appealed order, but in this situation due deference and great weight
should be given to the opinion of the trial judge who had the advantage of knowing
his own intent."). In its January 2018 order denying Goodwin's Rule 29(a) motion,
the trial court stated, "Although I extended this time by allowing the Defendant to
make his post-trial motions when I returned to Charleston two weeks after the
Defendant's conviction, no post-trial motions were filed or heard." Accordingly,

1
The same judge who presided over the 2003 trial denied Goodwin's Rule 29(a),
SCRCrimP, motion in January 2018.
we affirm the trial court's denial of Goodwin's Rule 29(a) motion because it was
not timely filed following his 2003 trial.2 See State v. Warren, 392 S.C. 235, 239,
708 S.E.2d 234, 236 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The court does not retain authority to
entertain a motion which is not made within ten days of sentencing.").3

AFFIRMED.4

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

2
Because we find Goodwin's Rule 29(a), SCRCP, post-trial motion was untimely,
we need not reach the trial court's alternative ruling on the merits of the motion.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 612 (1999) (finding an appellate court does not need to address the
remaining issues when the resolution of the prior issue is dispositive).
3
We acknowledge that in August 2007, a PCR court dismissed a PCR application
Goodwin had filed without prejudice finding "the parties agreed the timely
post-trial motions . . . have not been presented to the trial court and are still
pending for resolution." However, as discussed, the trial court could not have
reserved a right to rule on motions that Goodwin never articulated, nor can parties
agree to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court. See State v. Grim, 341
S.C. 63, 66, 533 S.E.2d 329, 330 (2000) ("[P]arties cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction by consent."). Further, we note that despite the PCR court's 2007
order, Goodwin still waited over nine additional years to file his post-trial motions.
4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.