Crowe v. Fred's Stores

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lisa E. Crowe, Appellant,

v.

Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. and NARA Properties,
LLC, Defendants,

Of which Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. is the
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001671

Appeal From Spartanburg County
R. Keith Kelly, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-330
Submitted September 1, 2019 – Filed October 9, 2019

AFFIRMED

Wendell Leon Hawkins and Aimee Victoria-Ann Leary,
both of Wendell L. Hawkins, PA, of Greer, for
Appellant.

Matthew Clark LaFave, of Crowe LaFave, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Lisa E. Crowe appeals the circuit court's order granting summary
judgment to Fred's Stores of Tennessee (Fred's) on her negligence cause of action.
On appeal, Crowe argues (1) Fred's owed her a duty of care and (2) her alleged
knowledge of the hazardous condition that caused her injury did not eliminate
Fred's duty. Because Crowe's injury occurred on property Fred's did not possess or
control, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
BPS, Inc. v. Worthy, 362 S.C. 319, 324, 608 S.E.2d 155, 158 (Ct. App. 2005)
("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court
applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP:
summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Singleton v.
Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 200, 659 S.E.2d 196, 204 (Ct. App. 2008) ("To establish
negligence in a premises liability action, a plaintiff must prove the following three
elements: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach
of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting
from the breach of duty."); id. ("The court must determine, as a matter of law,
whether the law recognizes a particular duty."); Hurst v. E. Coast Hockey League,
Inc., 371 S.C. 33, 37, 637 S.E.2d 560, 562 (2006) ("If there is no duty, then the
defendant in a negligence action is entitled to [summary] judgment as a matter of
law."); Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 353 S.C. 449, 456, 578 S.E.2d 711, 714
(2003) ("An affirmative legal duty exists only if created by statute, contract,
relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance."); id. at
456-57, 578 S.E.2d at 714 ("Ordinarily, the common law imposes no duty on a
person to act."); Miller v. City of Camden, 329 S.C. 310, 314, 494 S.E.2d 813, 815
(1997) ("One who controls the use of property has a duty of care not to harm others
by its use. Conversely, one who has no control owes no duty." (citations omitted));
S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.E.C.U.R.E. Underwriters Risk Retention Grp.,
347 S.C. 333, 341, 554 S.E.2d 870, 875 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The responsibility for an
injury negligently caused by a defect or dangerous condition or activity in or on
real property usually attaches to the owner or possessor, by virtue of his control
thereof . . . ." (quoting 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 4, at 351 (1990))).1

1
Appellant's argument that Respondent imposed a duty of care on itself through a
voluntarily undertaking is unpreserved. See S.C. Farm Bureau, 347 S.C. at 343,
554 S.E.2d at 875 ("An issue must be raised to and ruled on by the trial court for an
appellate court to review the issue.").
AFFIRMED.2

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.