Keel v. Atlantic Private Equity Group

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Deep Keel, LLC, Respondent,

v.

Atlantic Private Equity Group, LLC, Terry L. Rohlfing,
Jerry T. Caldwell, and Bluffton Village Town Center
Property Owners' Association, Defendants,

Of which Atlantic Private Equity Group, LLC, Terry L.
Rohlfing, and Jerry T. Caldwell are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000487

Appeal From Beaufort County
Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-270
Submitted May 8, 2019 – Filed July 24, 2019

AFFIRMED

Keating L. Simons, III, of Simons & Dean, of
Charleston, for Appellants.

Charles S. Altman, of The Law Offices of Charles S.
Altman, Meredith L. Coker, and Patrick J. Norton, all of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this action to collect deficiency judgments, Atlantic Private
Equity Group, LLC (Atlantic) appeals the master-in-equity's order granting
summary judgment to Deep Keel, LLC (Deep Keel). On appeal, Atlantic argues
the master erred in (1) granting summary judgment because Deep Keel's affidavits
failed to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e), SCRCP, with respect to the amount
of debt due on the loan and (2) construing personal guarantees to impose individual
liability as opposed to joint and several liability. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. Woodson v. DLI Props., LLC, 406 S.C. 517, 528, 753 S.E.2d 428, 434 (2014)
("In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our appellate court applies the same
standard as the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); id. ("Summary judgment is
proper if, viewing the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."); Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 660, 582 S.E.2d 432, 438 (Ct.
App. 2003) ("Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial
burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent's case, the
opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the
pleadings."); id. ("Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.").

2. HK New Plan Exch. Prop. Owner I, LLC v. Coker, 375 S.C. 18, 23, 649 S.E.2d
181, 184 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he construction of a contract is a question of law for
the court."); First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Conway Nat'l Bank, 282 S.C. 303,
305, 317 S.E.2d 776, 777 (Ct. App. 1984) (providing when a motion for summary
judgment presents a question as to the construction of a written contract, if the
language employed by the agreement is plain and unambiguous, the question is one
of law); id. ("In such a case, summary judgment is proper and a trial unnecessary
whe[n] the intention of the parties as to the legal effect of the contract may be
gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself."); McGill v. Moore, 381
S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009) ("The cardinal rule of contract
interpretation is to ascertain and give legal effect to the parties' intentions as
determined by the contract language."); Jordan v. Sec. Grp., Inc., 311 S.C. 227,
230, 428 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1993) ("Whe[n] the language of a contract is plain and
capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force
and effect."); id. ("The [c]ourt's duty is to enforce the contract made by the parties
regardless of its wisdom or folly, apparent unreasonableness, or the parties' failure
to guard their rights carefully.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.