Patterson 296129 v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James Wesley Patterson, #269129, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002628

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Milton G. Kimpson, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-223
Submitted May 1, 2019 – Filed June 26, 2019

AFFIRMED

James Wesley Patterson, pro se.

Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Barton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob. Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395,
414, 745 S.E.2d 110, 120 (2013) ("Statutory interpretation is a question of law
subject to de novo review."); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (2007) ("For purposes
of definition under South Carolina law, a 'no parole offense' means a class A, B, or
C felony . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (Supp. 2018) (classifying
manufacturing methamphetamine, third offense, as a class A felony); S.C. Code
Ann. § 24-13-150(A) (Supp. 2018) (providing that "an inmate convicted of a 'no
parole offense' . . . is not eligible for early release, discharge, or community
supervision . . . until [he] has served at least eighty-five percent" of his sentence);
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (2018) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a third or
subsequent offense in which all prior offenses were for possession of a controlled
substance pursuant to subsection (A), may have the sentence suspended and
probation granted and is eligible for parole . . . ." (emphases added)); Bolin v. S.C.
Dep't of Corr., 415 S.C. 276, 282, 781 S.E.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The
legislature's use of the phrase 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law,' in the
amendments to section[] 44-53-375 . . . expresses its intent to repeal section
24-13-100 to the extent it conflicts with amended section[] 44-53-375 . . . .");
Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 447, 441 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1994) ("If a statute's
language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there
is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no
right to look for or impose another meaning.").

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

AFFIRMED.1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.