Baum v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Uuno Mattias Baum, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001564

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-104
Submitted February 1, 2019 – Filed March 13, 2019

REVERSED

Uuno Mattias Baum, pro se.

Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Uuno Baum, pro se, appeals an administrative law court (ALC)
order affirming the final decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections
(the Department). On appeal, Baum argues the ALC erred by affirming the
Department's determination he was ineligible under section 24-3-40 of the South
Carolina Code (Supp. 2018) to designate persons or entities to receive immediate
distributions of his escrowed wages. We reverse.1

Section 24-3-40 provides:

(A) Unless otherwise provided by law, the employer of a
prisoner authorized to work . . . under [the prison
industries service program] . . . shall pay the prisoner's
wages directly to the Department . . . .
....

The Director of the Department . . . shall deduct the
following amounts from the gross wages of the prisoner:
....

(5) Ten percent must be held in an interest bearing
escrow account for the benefit of the prisoner.
....

(B) The Department . . . shall return a prisoner's wages
held in escrow pursuant to subsection (A) as follows:
....

(2) A prisoner serving life in prison . . . shall be given
the option of having his escrowed wages included in
his estate or distributed to the persons or entities of
his choice.

§ 24-3-40(A)(5), (B)(2) (emphasis added).

We find the language in section 24-3-40 ambiguous and construe subsections
(A)(5) and (B)(2) to allow for either immediate distribution of an inmate's
escrowed wages to persons or entities of his choosing or inclusion of these assets
in the distribution of his estate. See Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm'n, 397 S.C.
551, 556, 725 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2012) ("In construing statutory language, the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
statute must be read as a whole, and sections which are a part of the same general
statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect."). Subsection
(B)(2) provides inmates serving life sentences shall be given the option to include
their withheld wages in their estates or to distribute them to persons or entities of
their choosing. Further, subsection (A)(5) requires these wages be held in an
escrow account for the benefit of the prisoner. Because an inmate serving a life
sentence will never receive the benefit of his wages outside of prison–unlike those
who will be released during their lifetime–we find the Department's interpretation
of section 24-3-40 arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we reverse the ALC's
construction of section 24-3-40 and find the Department erred by refusing Baum
the option of designating persons or entities for immediate distribution of his
escrowed wages. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2018) (providing that
when the issue on appeal raises a question of law, this court may reverse the
decision of the ALC when it violates a statutory provision or is affected by an error
of law).2

REVERSED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

2
Baum also contends the Department's interpretation of section 24-3-40 violates
his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because we
are reversing the ALC's order above, we need not address this argument. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (providing that an appellate court need not address remaining
issues when determination of a prior issue is dispositive).