In the Interest of Dillon H.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Interest of Dillon H., a Juvenile under the Age of
Seventeen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001646

Appeal From Cherokee County
Kelly Pope-Black, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-089
Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 20, 2019

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of
Spartanburg, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dillon H. appeals the family court's order requiring him to
register as a sex offender after he was adjudicated delinquent for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC). Dillon argues the sex offender registry is a civil
disability, and pursuant to section 63-19-1410(C) of the South Carolina Code
(2010), no family court adjudication shall operate to impose civil disabilities
ordinarily resulting from conviction. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities: Miller v. Aiken, 364 S.C. 303, 307, 613 S.E.2d 364,
366 (2005) ("When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there
is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according
to its literal meaning."); Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat. Vendors Div.
of Unidynamics Corp., 319 S.C. 556, 558, 462 S.E.2d 858, 859 (1995) ("The
general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more
general one."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 88, 533 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2000)
("The law does not favor the implied repeal of statute."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-19-1410(C) (2010) (stating "[n]o adjudication by the court of the status of a
child is a conviction, nor does the adjudication operate to impose civil disabilities
ordinarily resulting from conviction" (emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 23-3-400 to -555 (2007 & Supp. 2018) (establishing the South Carolina Sex
Offender Registry Act (the Act)); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(A), (C)(1) (2007)
(providing that "[a]ny person, regardless of age," who is convicted of or "has been
adjudicated delinquent for" first-degree CSC "shall be required to register" as an
offender under the Act); State v. Latimore, 390 S.C. 88, 96, 700 S.E.2d 456, 461
(Ct. App. 2010), aff'd as modified, 397 S.C. 9, 723 S.E.2d 589 (2012) (noting "the
sex offender registration requirement is directed at a narrow class of defendants,
convicted sex offenders, rather than all felons"); In re Justin B., 419 S.C. 575, 585,
799 S.E.2d 675, 680 (2017) (rejecting the appellant's argument that the mandatory
lifetime registration provisions of the sex offender registry conflict with the
purpose of the South Carolina Children's Code); id. ("The [l]egislature intended
that registration . . . would apply to juveniles. This is evident by the plain language
of [the Act], which includes the phrases '[a]ny person, regardless of age' and
'adjudicated delinquent' in section 23-3-430(A) . . . ." (third alteration by court));
id. at 585-86, 799 S.E.2d at 680 ("The fact the [l]egislature chose to treat juveniles
the same as adults in requiring registration for committing sex offenses, but to treat
them differently in the punishment of ordinary offenses, is the [l]egislature's
prerogative.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.