State v. Miranda

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Carmine James Miranda, III, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001786

Appeal From Greenwood County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-007
Submitted November 1, 2018 – Filed January 4, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Carmine James Miranda, III appeals his conviction of felony
driving under the influence (DUI). Miranda argues the trial court erred by (1)
admitting the results of his blood test because the State failed to properly establish
the chain of custody and (2) instructing the jury pursuant to the implied consent
statute that it could infer he was under the influence of alcohol if his blood alcohol
content was above 0.08. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to the admission of Miranda's blood test results: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C.
201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91, 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011)
("[T]his [c]ourt has long held that a party offering into evidence fungible items
such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as
practicable." (first alteration by court) (quoting State v. Sweet, 374 S.C. 1, 6, 647
S.E.2d 202, 205 (2007))); State v. Smith, 326 S.C. 39, 41, 482 S.E.2d 777, 778
(1997) ("When moving to admit blood alcohol test results, the State must prove a
chain of custody of the blood sample from the time it[ is] drawn until it is tested.");
State v. Carter, 344 S.C. 419, 424, 544 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2001) ("Proof of chain of
custody need not negate all possibility of tampering so long as the chain of
possession is complete."); Hatcher, 392 S.C. at 92, 708 S.E.2d at 753 ("In applying
this rule, we have found evidence inadmissible only whe[n] there is a missing link
in the chain of possession because the identity of those who handled the
[substance] was not established at least as far as practicable." (second alteration
and emphasis by court) (quoting Carter, 344 S.C. at 424, 544 S.E.2d at 837)); State
v. Trapp, 420 S.C. 217, 231, 801 S.E.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 2017) ("When an
analyzed substance has passed through several hands, the identity of individuals
who acquired the evidence and what was done with the evidence between the
taking and the analysis must not be left to conjecture."); Hatcher, 392 S.C. at 91,
708 S.E.2d at 753 ("Testimony from each custodian of fungible evidence, however,
is not a prerequisite to establishing a chain of custody sufficient for admissibility."
(quoting Sweet, 374 S.C. at 7, 647 S.E.2d at 206)); Sweet, 374 S.C. at 6, 647
S.E.2d at 205-06 ("[I]f the identity of each person handling the evidence is
established, and the manner of handling is reasonably demonstrated, no abuse of
discretion by the trial court is shown in admitting the evidence absent proof of
tampering, bad faith, or ill-motive.").

2. As to the jury instruction: State v. Otts, 424 S.C. 150, 155, 817 S.E.2d 540, 543
(Ct. App. 2018) ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] charge must be both
erroneous and prejudicial." (quoting State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d
1, 3 (2003))); State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011)

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
("[T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South
Carolina." (alteration by court) (quoting Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594
S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004))); State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 27, 732 S.E.2d 880, 890
(2012) ("An appellate court generally will decline to set aside a conviction due to
insubstantial errors not affecting the result."); State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 611,
685 S.E.2d 802, 809 (2009) ("Errors, including erroneous jury instructions, are
subject to harmless error analysis."); State v. Middleton, 407 S.C. 312, 317, 755
S.E.2d 432, 435 (2014) ("When considering whether an error with respect to a jury
instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.'" (quoting State v. Kerr, 330
S.C. 132, 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1998))); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 56-5-2945 (2018) (defining the offense of felony DUI); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 56-5-2950(A) (2018) (providing that "[a] person who drives a motor vehicle in
this [s]tate is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of [his] breath,
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol . . . if
arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed
while . . . . driving . . . under the influence of alcohol" and establishing procedures
for obtaining a chemical test under such circumstances); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 56-5-2950(G)(3) (2018) ("In the criminal prosecution for . . . [felony DUI] the
alcohol concentration at the time of the test, as shown by chemical analysis of the
person's breath or other body fluids, gives rise to the following: . . . . if the alcohol
concentration was at that time eight one-hundredths of one percent [(0.08)] or
more, it may be inferred that the person was under the influence of alcohol."); State
v. Prince, 335 S.C. 466, 472, 517 S.E.2d 229, 232 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Statutes must
be read as a whole and sections that are part of the same general statutory scheme
must be construed together and each given effect, if reasonable."); State v. Gordon,
414 S.C. 94, 98, 777 S.E.2d 376, 378 (2015) ("In interpreting a statute, '[w]ords
must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.'" (alteration by court)
(quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 499, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007))); State
v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2011) ("Whe[n] the statute's
language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the
rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose
another meaning." (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578,
581 (2000))); State v. Hilton, 406 S.C. 580, 585, 752 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ct. App.
2013) ("All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the
legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language
used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the
statute." (quoting State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010)));
State v. Kinner, 301 S.C. 209, 210, 391 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1990) (holding the trial
court erred in charging the jury that it could infer the defendant was intoxicated
when the blood alcohol test did not comply with the implied consent statute but
affirming the defendant's conviction, finding the error was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because the record evince[d] overwhelming evidence" supporting
the conviction).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.