State v. Teresa A. McCracken-Hall

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Teresa Ann McCracken-Hall, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001192

Appeal From Horry County
Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-411
Heard October 10, 2018 – Filed November 7, 2018

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant
Attorney General Susannah Rawl Cole, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Conway, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Teresa McCracken-Hall appeals her conviction for murder,
arguing the circuit court erred in permitting a police officer, Gregory Lent, to
testify as to what he was told by another police officer, Billy Bellamy, regarding
Bellamy's interaction with her. McCracken-Hall also maintains the circuit court
erred in excluding evidence regarding a dispute between the victim and a third
party as that prevented her from presenting a complete defense. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Dunbar,
356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one
ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal."); State v. Brewer, 411 S.C. 401,
406, 768 S.E.2d 656, 658 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be reversed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732
S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012)); State v. Cope, 405 S.C. 317, 341, 748 S.E.2d 194, 206
(2013) ("[E]vidence of third-party guilt that only tends to raise a conjectural
inference that the third party, rather than the defendant, committed the crime
should be excluded."); id. ("Furthermore, to be admissible, evidence of third-party
guilt must be 'limited to such facts as are inconsistent with [the defendant's] own
guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own
innocence.'" (alteration by court) (quoting State v. Gregory, 198 S.C. 98, 104, 16
S.E.2d 532, 534 (1941))).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.