Catalano v. Catalano

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Theresa Catalano, Respondent,

v.

Jack Catalano, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000531

Appeal From Lexington County
Dorothy Mobley Jones, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-318
Submitted June 1, 2018 – Filed July 11, 2018

AFFIRMED

Gregory Samuel Forman, of Gregory S. Forman, PC, of
Charleston, for Appellant.

Theresa Catalano, of Columbia, pro se.

PER CURIAM: Jack Catalano (Husband) appeals a family court order requiring
him to pay Theresa Catalano (Wife) for additional costs she incurred as a result of
maintaining Husband as an ex-spouse on her South Carolina State Health
Insurance Plan (the plan) after the South Carolina Public Employee Benefit
Authority (PEBA) stopped allowing her to pay the plan's premium with pretax
funds because of Husband's inclusion. On appeal, Husband argues the family court
erred by (1) interpreting the phrase "cost of this coverage" in the parties' settlement
agreement (the agreement), which was incorporated into their divorce decree, as
contemplating tax consequences; (2) not allowing Husband a setoff to account for
the benefit Wife received in paying the plan's premium with pretax funds and
receiving reimbursements from husband in posttax funds prior to PEBA's policy
change; (3) requiring Husband to reimburse Wife for additional taxes she paid
between PEBA's policy change and the family court's hearing because he already
paid her with posttax funds; (4) awarding Wife attorney's fees; and (5) failing to
award Husband attorney's fees. We affirm.

As to issues one through three, we find the family court correctly interpreted the
agreement and ruled Husband was required to reimburse Wife for all costs
associated with including him on the plan. See Nicholson v. Nicholson, 378 S.C.
523, 532, 663 S.E.2d 74, 79 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In South Carolina, the construction
of a separation agreement is a matter of contract law." (quoting Davis v. Davis, 372
S.C. 64, 75, 641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006))); id. ("Where an agreement has
been merged into a court's decree, the decree, to the extent possible, should be
construed to effect the intent of both the [court] and the parties." (quoting Messer
v. Messer, 359 S.C. 614, 628, 598 S.E.2d 310, 318 (Ct. App. 2004))); id. ("A
court[-]approved divorce settlement must be viewed in accordance with principles
of equity and there is implied in every such agreement a requirement of
reasonableness." (quoting Ebert v. Ebert, 320 S.C. 331, 340, 465 S.E.2d 121, 126
(Ct. App. 1995))).

In his brief to this court, Husband argued this court should reverse the family
court's attorney's fees rulings only if it found error in the family court's
interpretation of the agreement. Accordingly, we decline to address issues four
and five. See Thomas v. Dootson, 377 S.C. 293, 295-96, 659 S.E.2d 253, 254 (Ct.
App. 2008) (holding a party is bound by concessions made in an appellate brief);
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d
591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address an issue when the
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

AFFIRMED. 1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.