Durrett v. Palmetto Health

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Phillip Durrett, Appellant,

v.

Palmetto Health Alliance d/b/a Palmetto Richland
Memorial and W. Ross, M.D., Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000429

Appeal From Richland County
Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-322
Submitted June 1, 2018 – Filed July 11, 2018

AFFIRMED

Melvin Dean Bannister, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Robert Gerald Chambers, Jr., and Carmelo Barone
Sammataro, both of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA,
of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Phillip Durrett appeals the circuit court's order granting Palmetto
Health Alliance d/b/a Palmetto Richland Memorial (Palmetto) summary judgment
because Durrett failed to provide any competent evidence showing a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to his medical malpractice claim. On appeal, Durrett
argues the circuit court erred by granting Palmetto summary judgment because the
subject matter of his medical malpractice claim was common knowledge and
required no expert testimony to help the jury evaluate Palmetto's conduct. We
affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court applies
the same standard as the trial court." David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C.
242, 247, 626 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006). "Summary judgment is appropriate when there
is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a
matter of law." Id. "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the
court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Durrett argues Palmetto acted negligently and caused him to suffer cardiac arrest,
experience respiratory arrest, and enter a coma for approximately nine days by
failing to monitor him before administering drugs to him; giving him
succinylcholine, which may cause complications including cardiac arrest; giving
him Norcuron, which should not be administered until succinylcholine wears off;
giving him more than the usual dosage of Midazolam Versed; failing to inform him
of the risk of cardiac arrest; overdosing him; providing drugs by "ramm[ing] a
sharp object (needle) into [him]"; and giving him sedative and anesthetic drugs
after being informed he was allergic to them. Durrett contends it is clear that
expert testimony was not required to determine whether medical malpractice
occurred in this case because "[a]n individual with common knowledge and
experience is aware that medications have possible side effects." We disagree.

We find the circuit court did not err by granting Palmetto's motion for summary
judgment because Durrett's case involved complex medical issues not within the
common knowledge of a layperson, and he failed to provide expert testimony. See
Melton v. Medtronic, Inc., 389 S.C. 641, 655, 698 S.E.2d 886, 893 (Ct. App. 2010)
("Medical malpractice lawsuits have specific requirements that must be satisfied in
order for a genuine issue of material fact to exist."); David, 367 S.C. at 248, 626
S.E.2d at 4 ("The plaintiff must provide expert testimony to establish both the
required standard of care and the defendants' failure to conform to that standard,
unless the subject matter lies within the ambit of common knowledge so that no
special learning is required to evaluate the conduct of the defendants."); Welch v.
Whitaker, 282 S.C. 251, 258, 317 S.E.2d 758, 763 (Ct. App. 1984) ("A plaintiff in
a medical malpractice case must prove proximate cause as well as negligence and
proof of proximate cause must be established by expert testimony . . . ." (citation
omitted)).

Here, Durrett alleged Palmetto acted negligently by administering sedative and
anesthetic drugs to him after he told Palmetto not to do so because he was allergic
to such drugs. Durrett also claimed Palmetto acted negligently by failing to
monitor him before and after administering these drugs and for giving him more of
the drugs. Although South Carolina case law has established the dangers of
exposing a patient to a known allergen is within the common knowledge of a
layperson, we find this is not the case here. See Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity
Providence Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 522, 763 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2014) (finding the
negligent exposure to latex of a patient with a known latex allergy was a matter
within the common knowledge); Melton, 389 S.C. at 663, 698 S.E.2d at 898 ("The
application of the common knowledge exception in proving negligence in a case
involving medical malpractice depends on the particular facts of the case.").
In the instant case, it is unclear whether Durrett told medical personnel at Palmetto
he was allergic to morphine and codeine; however, he admitted the hospital did not
administer morphine or codeine to him. Furthermore, Palmetto stated it knew
Durrett's allergies and did not administer morphine or codeine to him. Dr.
Clodfelter, Palmetto's expert witness and the only expert in this case, stated the
sedatives given to Durrett did not cause his cardiac arrest and were necessary to
perform a rapid trauma assessment on the uncooperative Durrett. Dr. Clodfelter
further asserted the amphetamines in Durrett's system and Durrett's drop in blood
pressure combined to cause Durrett's cardiac arrest. Dr. Clodfelter also stated the
illegal methamphetamine in Durrett's system could have negatively interacted with
any medication administered to Durrett. We find knowledge about how
methamphetamine interacts with medications and a drop in blood pressure goes
beyond the realm of common knowledge. We also find in-depth knowledge of
several medications, including their side effects, dosage amounts, and how they
should be administered, goes beyond the common knowledge of a layperson.
Finally, we find whether a patient's allergy to morphine and codeine precludes the
administration of other anesthetics and sedatives to the patient is not lay
knowledge. Thus, the subject matter of Durrett's case required expert testimony to
establish the standard of care, Palmetto's alleged deviation from the standard of
care, and causation.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to
Palmetto.1

AFFIRMED. 2

SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment, we do not address whether
Durrett's notice of intent and complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
timely file an expert affidavit. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need
not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of
the appeal).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.