State v. Ceaser

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Demetrik Maurice Ceaser, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000176

Appeal From Florence County
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-326
Submitted April 2, 2018 – Filed July 18, 2018

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Appellant Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements,
III, of Florence, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Demetrik Maurice Ceaser appeals his conviction for criminal
domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (CDVHAN), arguing the trial
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal
domestic violence (CDV). We reverse.

I.

Kerile Thomas and her mother, Carol Gerald, drove to Ceaser's house in Florence to
drop off Ceaser and Kerile's one-year-old daughter ("Minor") so she could visit with
her father. Once they arrived, Ceaser gave Kerile his debit card to go purchase a
meal for Minor. Kerile and Carol drove to KFC, leaving Minor with Ceaser.

When Kerile and Carol returned, Ceaser went outside to meet them while holding
Minor, and an argument erupted because Kerile suspected Ceaser had another
woman inside his home. During the argument, Ceaser asked Kerile for the KFC
receipt; he then reached into her car to grab the receipt from the floorboard of the
front passenger seat. Accounts of what happened next vary.

According to Ceaser's testimony, after he grabbed the receipt, Kerile "starting hitting
him with her hip" and punched him in the chest. Ceaser says he then "squeezed" a
drink that was sitting on top of the car and "what was left in the cup [he] threw on
[Kerile]." Kerile then struck Ceaser; he hit her once in return. Ceaser testified Carol
got out of the car and "ran straight at [him]." Carol threw her shoe at him, grabbed
his shirt, and began hitting him. During all of the commotion, Ceaser was holding
Minor. Ceaser maintained he struck both Kerile and Carol to protect himself and
the child.

Kerile testified she did not remember much of what occurred after Ceaser retrieved
the receipt. She recalled trying to "knock the cup out of [her] face" and "a lot of fruit
punch in [her] hair," but the next thing [she] remember[ed] is . . . it was dark." Kerile
stated she blacked out and Ceaser had "knocked her unconscious." After the
altercation, Kerile drove herself and her mother to a Walmart and then to a bowling
alley parking lot. Kerile testified she did not remember Ceaser striking her, nor did
she witness the quarrel between Ceaser and Carol. Kerile asserted she did not hit or
strike Ceaser.

According to Carol, after Ceaser picked up the receipt from the floorboard, he threw
the drink in Kerile's face and punched her. Carol admitted she got out of the car and
attacked Ceaser, throwing her shoe at him and grabbing his shirt, refusing to let go
until it ripped. After departing the scene with Kerile, Carol called her brother to tell
him about the incident. She later called 911, but Ceaser had already made the 911
call for law enforcement to respond.
Kerile and Carol eventually returned to Ceaser's house, where law enforcement had
arrived. Kerile was treated at McLeod Regional Medical Center for a small cut on
her cheek that was treated with one suture, and a fractured cheekbone that did not
require sutures. Kerile was prescribed pain medication and remained at the hospital
less than three hours before discharge.

The Florence County Grand Jury indicted Ceaser for CDVHAN as to Kerile, second
degree assault and battery on Carol, and unlawful conduct towards a child. The case
was tried on January 19, 2016. The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal on the
unlawful conduct charge. Ceaser requested a jury instruction on the lesser included
offense of CDV, contending it was for the jury to determine whether Kerile's injuries
constituted "serious bodily injury." Citing State v. Golston,1 the court refused to
charge the lesser included offense of CDV.

The jury acquitted Ceaser of second degree assault and battery and the lesser
included offense of third degree assault and battery related to Carol, but found him
guilty of CDVHAN as to Kerile. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

II.

Ceaser argues the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of CDV, claiming there was evidence upon which the jury could
have found he committed only CDV instead of the indicted offense of CDVHAN.
We agree.

"We must reverse and remand for a new trial if the evidence in the record is such
that the jury could have found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense instead of
the crime charged." State v. Gilmore, 396 S.C. 72, 77, 719 S.E.2d 688, 690 (Ct.
App. 2011). The "task of the trial court in deciding whether to charge the lesser
offense . . . is to examine the record to determine if there is evidence upon which the
jury could find the defendant was guilty of the lesser offense, but not guilty of the
greater offense." Golston, 399 S.C. at 398, 732 S.E.2d at 178. "[A] trial court
commits reversible error if it fails to give a requested charge on an issue raised by
the evidence." State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993).

To prove CDV, the State was required to show the defendant either "cause[d]
physical harm or injury to [his] own household member," or "offer[ed] or

1
399 S.C. 393, 732 S.E.2d 175 (Ct. App. 2012).
attempt[ed] to cause physical harm or injury to [his] own household member with
apparent present ability under circumstances reasonably creating fear of imminent
peril." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-35(A) (2012). A person is guilty of CDVHAN
when, in addition to proving CDV, the State proves one of the aggravating
circumstances set forth in subsection § 16-25-65 (A)(1) (2012). Golston, 399 S.C.
at 397, 732 S.E.2d at 178. At the time relevant to Ceaser's trial, those aggravating
circumstances included: (1) "an assault and battery which involves the use of a
deadly weapon or results in serious bodily injury to the victim" and (2) "an assault,
with or without an accompanying battery, which would reasonably cause a person
to fear imminent serious bodily injury or death." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-65(A)
(2012).2

We believe a rational jury could have found Ceaser was guilty only of CDV instead
of CDVHAN. The CDVHAN statute applicable to Ceaser's charges did not define
"serious bodily injury." Nor was the trial court requested to instruct the jury as to a
definition. It appears the trial court believed that, as in Golston, Kerile's injuries
were so severe that no rational jury could conclude they did not constitute "serious
bodily injury."

There was evidence that, if believed by the jury, showed Kerile's injuries may not
have constituted serious bodily injury. For instance, Kerile testified this was not the

2
The CDVHAN statute was amended in 2015. It no longer contains the phrase
"serious bodily injury," and instead reads in part:

(A) A person who violates Section 16-25-20(A) is guilty
of the offense of domestic violence of a high and
aggravated nature when one of the following occurs. The
person:
(1) commits the offense under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life and great bodily injury to the victim
results;
(2) commits the offense, with or without an
accompanying battery and under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life, and would reasonably cause a person to
fear imminent great bodily injury or death.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-65(A)(1)–(2) (2015).
first time she "blacked out," making it unclear whether she had been knocked
unconscious by Ceaser or had lost consciousness due to a separate condition. Her
emergency room visit was relatively brief, and the treatment prescribed to her upon
discharge was simple pain medication. Kerile testified she suffered from continuing
headaches and may require future surgery, although no medical evidence was
offered on these points. Kerile's injuries did not rise to the level seen in Golston,
where the victim was beaten beyond recognition, had prolonged difficulty breathing,
could not open her eyes for 10 days, and doctors found permanent injury.

Of course, we recognize Kerile's injuries were substantial. A rational jury could
have concluded they amounted to serious bodily injury, even if the jury had been
presented the option of convicting on the lesser offense. But Ceaser was entitled to
have the jury consider both options based on the evidence. It appears the jury had
some reservations about whether the State had proven CDVHAN, as it sent the court
a note during deliberations asking for the definition of CDVHAN again. This
request for clarification may have been triggered by the instruction they had been
given on the assault and battery in the second degree charge regarding Carol, which
had defined "moderate bodily injury" as follows:

Moderate bodily injury means physical injury that
involves prolonged loss of consciousness or that caused
temporary or . . . moderate disfigurement or temporary
loss of the function of a bodily member or organ or injury
that requires medical treatment when the treatment
requires regional or general anesthesia or injury that
results in a fracture or dislocation. Moderate bodily injury
does not include a one-time treatment and subsequent
observation of cuts and scratches and abrasions or bruises
that would not ordinarily require extensive medical care.

Complicating things, Dr. Bingham testified Kerile's medical records revealed she
"had a three millimeter laceration requiring one suture" and a fracture to her
cheekbone. Given this medical evidence and the charge on moderate bodily injury,
a rational jury may have been confused as to whether Kerile's injuries fit the
undefined element of "serious bodily injury." We find the evidence entitled Ceaser
to a charge on the lesser included offense that did not require proof of this element.

Thus, because "[a] trial judge must charge a lesser included offense if there is any
evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant committed the lesser rather
than the greater offense," we reverse Ceaser's conviction and remand for a new trial.
State v. White, 361 S.C. 407, 412, 605 S.E.2d 540, 542 (2004).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.3

SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.