State v. Keyon Deshawn Robinson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Keyon Devon Deshawn Robinson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002434

Appeal From Greenville County
Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-106
Heard November 8, 2017 – Filed March 14, 2018

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Keyon Devon Deshawn Robinson appeals his convictions for
trafficking in cocaine base (more than ten grams) and resisting arrest, arguing the
circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress because law enforcement
seized the drugs during an unlawful search. We affirm.

At approximately 4:37 a.m. on December 18, 2011, Deputy Chris Hinton of the
Greenville County Sheriff's Department responded to a report of individuals
fighting in a Waffle House parking lot and arguing with a security officer. When
Deputy Hinton arrived, he observed Robinson leaving the Waffle House; Robinson
was screaming, using profane language, cursing at security officers, and holding a
Crown Royal bag. Initially, Deputy Hinton did not recognize the bag as a Crown
Royal bag because he did not see the logo; however, he observed that the bag was
purple and the size of a liquor bottle.

As Deputy Hinton approached, Robinson walked toward a vehicle and dropped the
Crown Royal bag into the back seat. Deputy Hinton then made contact with
Robinson outside the vehicle near the rear door on the driver's side, advised him he
was under arrest for public disorderly conduct, and placed him in handcuffs.
Deputy Hinton observed that Robison smelled of alcohol. While Deputy Hinton
was arresting Robinson, the driver attempted to exit the vehicle; Deputy Hinton
had to repeatedly instruct the driver to remain in the vehicle.

Immediately after handcuffing Robinson, Deputy Hinton grabbed the Crown Royal
bag from the back seat of the vehicle and found narcotics in the bag. Only a few
seconds elapsed between Robinson throwing the bag into the back seat and Deputy
Hinton retrieving it. Deputy Hinton and Robinson remained next to the vehicle
between the back door and the trunk until a backup officer arrived to secure the
vehicle's other occupants. Three people were inside the vehicle during the
encounter—two passengers in the back seat, where Robinson dropped the Crown
Royal bag, and the driver in the front seat. After a backup officer arrived on the
scene, Deputy Hinton secured Robinson in his patrol car.

"The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures."
State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2011); see also U.S.
Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ."); S.C. Const.
art. I, § 10 (protecting "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures").
"Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement." Wright, 391 S.C. at 442, 706 S.E.2d at 327.
Exceptions to the warrant requirement include: "(1) search incident to a lawful
arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile exception, (5) the plain
view doctrine, (6) consent, and (7) abandonment." State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82,
89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012).

"Pursuant to the automobile exception, if there is probable cause to search a
vehicle, a warrant is not necessary so long as the search is based on facts that
would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been
actually obtained." State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 320, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482
(2007). "Probable cause to conduct a search exists where 'the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'" State v. Morris, 411 S.C.
571, 580, 769 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 696 (1996)). "The principle components of a determination of . . . probable
cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then
the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to . . . probable cause." Id. at 580–
81, 769 S.E.2d at 859 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696) (alteration in original).

"Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (emphasis added).

We find no clear error in the circuit court's denial of Robinson's motion to suppress
because Deputy Hinton's search fell within two exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement—the automobile exception and the exception
for a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Brown, 401 S.C. at 87, 736 S.E.2d at
265 ("When reviewing a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, an appellate
court must affirm the trial court's ruling if there is any evidence to support it; the
appellate court may reverse only for clear error.").

Upon arriving at the Waffle House after receiving a report of people arguing with a
security officer, Deputy Hinton witnessed Robinson using profane language,
cursing at security officers, and carrying a Crown Royal bag. Deputy Hinton
further observed that Robinson smelled of alcohol. As Deputy Hinton approached,
he saw Robinson throw the Crown Royal bag into the back seat of a vehicle.
Although Deputy Hinton did not immediately recognize that the bag was
specifically a Crown Royal bag, he identified that the bag was purple and the size
of a liquor bottle. Based upon these observations, Deputy Hinton had probable
cause to seize the bag without a warrant from the back seat of the vehicle based
upon his reasonable belief that it contained evidence of Robinson's gross
intoxication. See Weaver, 374 S.C. at 320, 649 S.E.2d at 482 ("Pursuant to the
automobile exception, if there is probable cause to search a vehicle, a warrant is
not necessary so long as the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance
of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained."); Morris, 411
S.C. at 580, 769 S.E.2d at 859 (providing probable cause exists when "the known
facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in
the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" (quoting Ornelas,
517 U.S. at 696)); S.C. Code Ann. §16-17-530 (2015) (providing a person is guilty
of public disorderly conduct if he is found in a public place "in a grossly
intoxicated condition or otherwise conducting himself in a disorderly or boisterous
manner" or "us[ing] obscene or profane language.").

Likewise, because Deputy Hinton had a reasonable belief that the vehicle
contained evidence of Robinson's disorderly conduct, it was not necessary that he
obtain a warrant prior to his search of the back seat and his seizure of the Crown
Royal bag. See Brown, 401 S.C. at 89, 736 S.E.2d at 266 (recognizing a search
incident to a lawful arrest as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement); Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 ("Police may search a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." (emphasis added)). Thus,
Deputy Hinton lawfully seized the bag and the drugs inside pursuant to Robinson's
lawful arrest.

Conclusion

Robinson's convictions are

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.