U.S. Bank v. Otto

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

U.S. Bank, NA, as Trustee relating to the Chevy Chase
Funding, LLC Mortgage Backed Certificates, Series
2004-B, Plaintiff,

v.

Alyce F. Otto, Individually; Alyce F. Otto Trustee Under
Declaration of Trust of Alyce F. Otto dated the 17th of
November 2009; TD Bank, NA; The United States of
America, acting by and through its agency, the Internal
Revenue Service; Laura Kerhulas Giese, as Co-Trustee
of the Theodore Ernest Kerhulas Trust Under Declaration
of Trust dated May 25, 2004; Mark Warner Kerhulas, as
Co-Trustee of the Theodore Ernest Kerhulas Trust Under
Declaration of Trust dated May 25, 2004; Jackson L.
Munsey, Jr.; Citibank, N.A., Defendants,

Of whom Jackson L. Munsey, Jr. is the Appellant,

and

U.S. Bank, NA and Alyce F. Otto are the Respondents.

Alyce F. Otto, Trustee, Plaintiff,

v.

Jackson L. Munsey, Jr., Defendant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000099
Appeal From Spartanburg County
Gordon G. Cooper, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-075
Submitted January 1, 2018 – Filed February 7, 2018

AFFIRMED

David Richard Price, Jr. and Samuel Barton Tooker, both
of David R. Price, Jr., P.A., of Greenville, for Appellant.

Kenneth C. Anthony, Jr., of The Anthony Law Firm,
P.A., of Spartanburg, and Sarah Patrick Spruill, of
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A., of Greenville, both for
Respondent Alyce F. Otto.

Richard Carlton Keller, of Burr & Forman, LLP, of
Birmingham, AL, and Erica Greer Lybrand, of Rogers
Townsend & Thomas, PC, of Columbia, both for
Respondent U.S. Bank, NA.

PER CURIAM: Jackson Munsey appeals the Master-in-Equity's orders denying
his motion to set aside default, denying his motion for relief from default, and
judgment of foreclosure and sale, arguing the Master-in-Equity erred by (1)
refusing to relieve him from entry of default and (2) finding that he had no
equitable interest in the property and no equitable right of redemption. We affirm1
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to Munsey's first argument: Williams v. Vanvolkenburg, 312 S.C. 373, 375,
440 S.E.2d 408, 409 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Whether good cause is established is within
the sound discretion of the [Master-in-Equity]."); Stark Truss Co., Inc. v. Superior
Const. Corp., 360 S.C. 503, 510, 602 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Rule 55(c),
SCRCP, allows the circuit court to set aside an entry of default 'for good cause

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
shown.'" (quoting Rule 55(c), SCRCP)); Sundown Operating Co., Inc. v. Intedge
Industries, Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607-08, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("This standard
requires a party seeking relief from an entry of default under Rule 55(c) to provide
an explanation for the default and give reasons why vacation of the default entry
would serve the interests of justice. Once a party has put forth a satisfactory
explanation for the default, the trial court must also consider: (1) the timing of the
motion for relief; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the
degree of prejudice to the plaintiff if relief is granted.").

2. As to Munsey's second argument: Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C.
229, 237, 391 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1989) ("Our scope of review for a case heard by a
Master-in-Equity who enters a final judgment is the same as that for review of a
case heard by a circuit court without a jury."); Fox v. Moultrie, 379 S.C. 609, 613,
666 S.E.2d 915, 917 (2008) ("In an action in equity, tried with reference to a
[M]aster[-in-Equity], this [c]ourt reviews the evidence and determines the facts
according to its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, though it is not
required to disregard the findings of the master."); Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp.,
351 S.C. 167, 173-174, 568 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2002) ("[C]ourts of equity can relieve
a defaulting purchaser from the strict forfeiture provision in an installment land
contract and provide the opportunity for redemption when equity so demands.");
Lewis at 171, 568 S.E.2d at 363 ("Basic contract law provides that when a contract
is clear and unambiguous, the language alone determines the contract's force and
effect. It is not the function of the court to rewrite contracts for parties." (citation
omitted)); Lewis at 174, 568 S.E.2d at 364 n.5 (2002) (noting "[a] variety of case-
specific factors should be considered to determine if redemption is equitable under
the circumstances[,]" including the amount of the purchaser's equity, the length of
the default period, the number of defaults, the value of improvements to the
property, the adequacy of the property's maintenance, amount of forfeiture, reason
for delay in payment, the speed in which equity is sought, the amount of money the
purchaser would forfeit compared to the purchase price, and the relationship of the
monthly payments to the fair rental value of the property).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.