Angel Cartmel v. Edward Taylor

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Angela Cartmel, Respondent,

v.

Edward Brice Taylor, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000635

Appeal From Aiken County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-046
Submitted November 1, 2017 – Filed January 31, 2018

AFFIRMED

Robert Bratton Varnado and Alexis M. Wimberly, both
of Brown & Varnado, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for
Appellant.

Bradford M. Owensby, of Brad Owensby Law Firm,
LLC, of Aiken, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 22, 644 S.E.2d
663, 667 (2007) ("Arbitrability determinations are subject to de novo review.
Nevertheless, a [trial] court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any
evidence reasonably supports the findings."); McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 185,
672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009) ("The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to
ascertain and give legal effect to the parties' intentions as determined by the
contract language. Where the contract's language is clear and unambiguous, the
language alone determines the contract's force and effect. A contract is read as a
whole document so that one may not create an ambiguity by pointing out a single
sentence or clause."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10(a) (2005) ("A written agreement
to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract
to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. Notice that a contract is subject to
arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined capital letters, or
rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract and unless such
notice is displayed thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration."); 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2009) ("A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."); Soil
Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 459-60, 476 S.E.2d 149,
152 (1996) (holding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts the South
Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act when the underlying transaction involves
interstate commerce); Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 538-39, 542
S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001) ("Unless the parties have contracted to the contrary, the
FAA applies in federal or state court to any arbitration agreement regarding a
transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce, regardless of whether . . . the
parties contemplated an interstate transaction."); Bradley v. Brentwood Homes,
Inc., 398 S.C. 447, 454, 730 S.E.2d 312, 315-16 (2012) ("[I]n order to activate the
application of the FAA, the commerce involved in the contract must be interstate
or foreign."); id. at 455, 730 S.E.2d at 316 ("To ascertain whether a transaction
involves commerce within the meaning of the FAA, the court must examine the
agreement, the complaint, and the surrounding facts."); Thornton v. Trident Med.
Ctr., LLC, 357 S.C. 91, 96, 592 S.E.2d 50, 52 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Our courts
consistently look to the essential character of the contract when applying the
FAA."); Bradley, 398 S.C. at 456, 730 S.E.2d at 317 ("This court has continued to
adhere to the view that the development of real estate is an inherently intrastate
transaction.").

AFFIRMED.1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.