Brantley v. The City of Rock Hill

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Nadine Brantley, Appellant,

v.

The City of Rock Hill, a body politic and subdivision of
the State of South Carolina, and Wherry Construction
Co., Inc., Defendants,

Of Which The City of Rock Hill, a body politic and
subdivision of the State of South Carolina is the
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000079

Appeal From York County
S. Jackson Kimball, III, Special Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-335
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed August 2, 2017

AFFIRMED

Nadine Brantley, of Charlotte, North Carolina, pro se.

William Mark White and Jeremy Daniel Melville, of
Spencer & Spencer, PA, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Nadine Brantley appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of the City of Rock Hill (the City) on her claims for
nuisance, inverse condemnation, and gross negligence. We affirm1 pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to Brantley's claim the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
her nuisance claim: Rule 56(c), SCRCP (stating the circuit court should grant
summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law"); Carolina All. for Fair Emp't v. S.C. Dep't of Labor,
Licensing, & Regulation, 337 S.C. 476, 485, 523 S.E.2d 795, 800 (Ct. App. 1999)
("The plain language of Rule 56(c), SCRCP, mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's
case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."); Hedgepath v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 348 S.C. 340, 355, 559 S.E.2d 327, 336 (Ct. App. 2001)
("[W]hen plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds
cannot differ, summary judgment should be granted."); id. at 354, 559 S.E.2d at
335 ("Once the moving party carries its initial burden, the 'opposing party must,
under Rule 56(e), [SCRCP,] "do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" but "must come forward with specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 115, 410 S.E.2d 537, 545
(1991))); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(7) (2005) ("The governmental entity is not
liable for a loss resulting from . . . a nuisance . . . .").

2. As to Brantley's claim the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
her inverse condemnation claim: Marietta Garage, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 352 S.C. 95, 101, 572 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ct. App. 2002) ("To prove an
inverse condemnation, a plaintiff must show: (1) an affirmative, positive,
aggressive act on the part of the governmental agency; (2) a taking; (3) the taking
is for a public use; and (4) the taking has some degree of permanence."); Hawkins
v. City of Greenville, 358 S.C. 280, 291, 594 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ct. App. 2004)
("Allegations of mere failure to act are insufficient."); id. at 291-92, 594 S.E.2d at
562-63 (holding the City of Greenville's design and maintenance of the drainage
system did not constitute inverse condemnation).

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
3. As to Brantley's claim the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on
her gross negligence claim: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(12) (2005) ("The
governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from . . . licensing powers or
functions . . . except when the power or function is exercised in a grossly negligent
manner . . . ."); Clyburn v. Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 17, 317 S.C. 50, 53, 451
S.E.2d 885, 887-88 (1994) ("Gross negligence is the intentional, conscious failure
to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing
intentionally that one ought not to do. Negligence is the failure to exercise due
care, while gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care. Gross negligence
ordinarily is a mixed question of law and fact. When the evidence supports but
one reasonable inference, however, the question becomes a matter of law for the
court." (citations omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.