Winfrey v. Archway Services, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Clarence Winfrey, Employee, Claimant, Respondent,

v.

Archway Services, Inc., Employer, and American Fire &
Casualty Insurance Company c/o Liberty Mutual Group,
Carrier, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001788

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-336
Heard December 6, 2016 – Filed August 2, 2017

AFFIRMED

Brett Harris Bayne, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie,
LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants.

Preston F. McDaniel, of McDaniel Law Firm, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Archway Services, Inc., and American Fire & Casualty Insurance
Company c/o Liberty Mutual Group (collectively Archway) appeal from the order
of the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate
Panel) finding Clarence Winfrey suffered a compensable injury under the Workers'
Compensation Act. Archway alleges the Appellate Panel erred in (1) failing to
vacate the order of the Single Commissioner because the Single Commissioner
erred in holding the original hearing of Archway's objection because the Single
Commissioner operated in an appellate capacity without proper jurisdiction; (2)
failing to find a date on which Winfrey suffered a plaque rupture in his heart; (3)
failing to find what caused the plaque rupture in Winfrey's heart; (4) failing to find
a date on which Winfrey suffered a myocardial infarction; (5) relying on Dr.
Jeffery Travis's written medical opinion when the evidence presented at the hearing
and his own subsequent deposition testimony directly contradicted his written
medical opinion; (6) relying on Dr. Lanneau Lide's written medical opinion when
the evidence presented at the hearing and his own subsequent deposition testimony
directly contradicted his written medical opinion; (7) relying on Dr. Karen
Greenfield's written medical opinion when the evidence presented at the hearing
and her own subsequent deposition testimony directly contradicted her written
medical opinion; (8) finding Winfrey began sweating the night of the electrical
shock when Winfrey's own testimony refutes that finding; and (9) finding that
three physicians have opined the electrical shock resulted in Winfrey's heart attack
regardless of the date on which the heart attack occurred. We affirm.

II. FACTS

On May 22, 2013, Winfrey received an electrical shock while working on a
rotisserie oven in the course of his employment. On May 28, 2013, Winfrey
underwent surgery at Lexington Medical Center for a myocardial infarction and
ventricular septal defect. Winfrey filed a Form 50, Employee's Notice of Claim,
on June 6, 2013, alleging he suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the
course and scope of his employment to his heart, left hand/arm/shoulder, neck,
head, brain, and chest. Archway began providing Winfrey with temporary total
disability benefits on June 1, 2013, continuing through September 14, 2013.
Archway additionally provided Winfrey medical treatment between the date of the
injury and September 12, 2013. On September 12, 2013, Archway terminated
Winfrey's workers' compensation benefits following a good faith investigation.

Following the Single Commissioner's order finding Archway complied with
section 42-9-260 of the South Carolina Code (2015) in denying Winfrey worker
compensation benefits based on a good faith investigation, Winfrey filed a Form
50 with the Commission alleging he had suffered a compensable injury. Winfrey
requested a hearing before the Commission through his Form 50. Archway filed a
Form 51 denying Winfrey had suffered a compensable injury. The hearing was
held before the Single Commissioner on January 13, 2014.

Archway objected on jurisdictional grounds to the Form 50 hearing being held
because of the outstanding order from the Form 15 hearing held in response to
Archway's denial of benefits after a good faith investigation under section 42-9-
260. Specifically, Archway alleged the Single Commissioner in the Form 50
hearing would be sitting in a quasi-appellate capacity because the order of the
Single Commissioner in the Form 15 hearing found Winfrey suffered a heart attack
on May 28, 2013, and if the Commissioner in the Form 50 hearing found another
date, the Commissioner would be repudiating the order of the Commissioner in the
Form 15 hearing. After considering Archway's objection, the Single
Commissioner denied the motion and proceeded with the Form 50 hearing. In the
order following the hearing, the Single Commissioner found with respect to
Archway's jurisdictional argument:

This Commissioner was assigned to hear this case as to
the merits/compensability issue. The decision of
Commissioner Beck [(the Form 15 hearing
Commissioner)] is under appeal and after the arguments
made at the hearing on this issue were considered by me,
this Commissioner would not have held this hearing on
the merits if this Commissioner did not believe that in
doing so that I was not operating within my authority to
hold the hearing on the merits/compensability. Further,
in reference to my decision as set forth hereinafter, this
Order is not inconsistent with Commissioner Beck's
Findings and no attempt was made to change or disagree
with Commissioner Beck's Finding of a heart attack
occurring on a particular date. In fact, it is my specific
and intentional finding based on the evidence presented
before me that [Winfrey] injured his heart on the date of
the accident. Under the testimony and evidence
presented, having made that decision, whether or not the
heart attack occurred on a particular date is not made and
there is no Finding contained within this Order that
[Winfrey] sustained a heart attack on the date of the
shock/electrocution. This order is written to make
Findings in reference to the merits of the claim as to
whether or not the injury to [Winfrey's] heart stemmed
from the accident. Whether or not I agree or disagree
with Commissioner Beck's Finding as to a particular date
for the heart attack, no decision is made on that issue so
as to prevent any conflict with the previous Decision by
commissioner Beck and as being an unnecessary Finding
to the issues before me, i.e., merits/compensability.

In further support of the decision to hold the Form 50 hearing, the Single
Commissioner cited the following language from Commissioner Beck's order from
the Form 15 hearing:

It is furthermore ordered that all other issues in
contention, specifically including the question of whether
[Winfrey] sustained an injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment with [Archway]
resulting [in] compensable disability is preserved for
adjudication at the hearing set pursuant to [Winfrey's]
October 21, 2013, Form 50 Employee's Request for
Hearing.

During the Form 50 hearing, Winfrey testified he was working on a rotisserie oven
at a Publix Supermarket on May 22, 2013, when he came into contact with an
exposed electrical wire that caused a significant shock to his left arm all the way up
to his neck, shoulder, and chest. Winfrey stated he immediately called his
supervisor Bobby Ruppe to notify him of the electrical shock. Winfrey recalled he
had never suffered such a significant shock in his life. Winfrey testified he awoke
the next morning dripping in sweat yet attempted to go to work. Winfrey recalled
he made it to Wal-Mart to work on some machinery in the deli but could not
proceed with the tasks because he was in too much pain. Winfrey stated he spent
the next few days at home suffering significant pain, which he attempted to treat
with Motrin and Tylenol. Winfrey testified he presented to Doctor's Care on May
28, 2013. Dr. Karen Greenfield examined him and became alarmed after
performing an EKG. Winfrey was immediately transferred to Lexington Medical
Center and into the care of Dr. Lanneau Lide and Dr. Jeffery Travis. The doctors
discovered he had a ventricular septal defect and required immediate surgery.
Winfrey underwent surgery to repair the defect and has been under the care of Dr.
Travis and Dr. Lide since that day.
Following the hearing, the Single Commissioner issued an order finding Winfrey
had met his burden of proof by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence
he sustained a compensable injury to his heart as a result of the electrical shock,
which occurred on May 22, 2013. Specifically, the Single Commissioner found
Winfrey sufficiently demonstrated the electrical shock resulted in his heart attack,
and ventricular septal defect. The Single Commissioner reinstated benefits to
September 15, 2013, when benefits were stopped by Archway under section 42-9-
260 of the South Carolina Code. Having been found to have sustained a
compensable injury to his heart, the Single Commissioner ruled Winfrey is to:

[R]eceive medical care for all injuries and conditions
stemming from the accident that occurred in the matter
and to specifically include all conditions related to the
heart as found to be causally related by the authorized
treating physicians. . . . [Archway] reserve[s] the right to
contest the compensability of any injury or condition
opined to be related to the injury involving any bodily
part, member, organ or system and the right to direct the
treatment for all causally related medical problems
outside the medical expertise of the two authorized
treating physicians including the right to choose
authorized treating physicians to provide that medical
care.

In support of the finding that Winfrey suffered a compensable injury, the Single
Commissioner found Winfrey received an electrical shock during the course of his
employment in the range of 240-480 volts resulting in pain that got progressively
worse. The Single Commissioner noted Winfrey began sweating the night of the
accident and into the next morning. The Single Commissioner specifically relied
on the opinions of three physicians, all of whom opined to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the electrical shock ultimately resulted in Winfrey's heart
attack, regardless of the date it actually occurred. The Single Commissioner found
the deposition testimony of Dr. Travis, the treating cardiovascular surgeon, to be
especially compelling. Further, the Single Commissioner noted Dr. Lide, the
treating cardiologist, twice testified he saw no way Winfrey's myocardial infarction
and the ventricular septal defect were not related to the electrical shock. The
Single Commissioner explained he fully considered the opinion of Dr. Feldman,
Archway's expert and the only physician who found no nexus between the accident
and the injury, but found his opinion outweighed by the opinions of the other three
doctors, each of whom treated Winfrey rather than simply reviewing his medical
records. With respect to Dr. Feldman's conclusions, the Single Commissioner
noted Dr. Feldman:

(a) did not examine [Winfrey] or even speak to
[Winfrey]; (b) did not see [Winfrey's] heart, as opposed
to Dr. Travis, who held it in his hand; (c) initially states
in his written opinion that it is "possible" that there was
no connection between the plaque rupture and the
electrical shock, and then in the very next sentence states
that it is of the "highest certainty"; (d) Dr. Feldman is a
cardiologist and not a cardiovascular surgeon; nor has he
undergone a surgical residency; and (e) Dr. Feldman was
specifically asked to opine in writing as to whether there
was a connection between an electrical shock and a
[ventricular septal defect], although he does address other
pertinent issues for [Archway] in his deposition.

Following the issuance of the Single Commissioner's order, Archway filed a Form
30 and appealed to the Appellate Panel.

The Appellate Panel held a hearing on the matter on May 19, 2014. Following the
hearing, the Appellate Panel issued an order affirming the Single Commissioner's
order in part and reversing in part. Specifically, the Appellate Panel reversed the
Single Commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the
alleged injury to Winfrey's head, brain, or both. The Appellate Panel denied
Winfrey's alleged injury due to insufficient medical evidence after raising the issue
before the Commission. The Appellate Panel affirmed all remaining issues
decided by the Single Commissioner and appealed by Archway in its Form 30.
With respect to the compensability of Winfrey's myocardial infarction and
ventricular septal defect, the Appellate Panel found facts essentially identical to
those found by the Single Commissioner. Concerning Archway's jurisdictional
argument, the Appellate Panel held, pursuant to section 42-3-180 of the South
Carolina Code (2015), the Single Commissioner had jurisdiction over the Form 50
hearing such that a hearing on compensability could be conducted despite the
ongoing appeal from the Form 15 hearing. This appeal followed.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Appellate Panel erred by failing to vacate the Single
Commissioner's decision and order because the Single Commissioner erred
in holding the original hearing over Appellants' objections because, by
conducting the hearing and ruling on material compensability issues, the
Single Commissioner operated in an appellate capacity without proper
jurisdiction?

2. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in failing to find a date on which Winfrey
suffered a myocardial infarction?

3. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in failing to find what caused the plaque
rupture in Winfrey's heart?

4. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in failing to find a date on which Winfrey
suffered a plaque rupture in his heart?

5. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in relying on Dr. Travis's written medical
opinion when the evidence presented at the hearing and his own subsequent
deposition testimony directly contradicted his written medical opinion?

6. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in relying on Dr. Lide's written medical
opinion when the evidence presented at the hearing and his own subsequent
deposition testimony directly contradicted his written medical opinion?

7. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in relying on Dr. Greenfield's written
medical opinion when the evidence presented at the hearing and her own
subsequent deposition testimony directly contradicted her written medical
opinion?

8. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in Finding of Fact #7 by finding Winfrey
began sweating the night of the electrical shock when Winfrey's own
testimony refutes that finding?

9. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in Finding of Fact #9 that three
physicians have opined the electrical shock resulted in Winfrey's heart attack
regardless of the date on which the heart attack occurred?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act1 (APA) governs the standard of
judicial review in workers' compensation cases. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130,
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Under the APA, this court's review is limited to
deciding whether the Appellate Panel's decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence or is controlled by an error of law. Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360
S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2004). "Substantial evidence is
not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but such
evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable minds
to reach the conclusion the [Appellate Panel] reached." Shealy v. Aiken Cty., 341
S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000).

"On appeal from [the Appellate Panel], this [c]ourt can reverse or modify the
decision if it is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record." Nicholson v.
S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 411 S.C. 381, 384, 769 S.E.2d 1, 2 (2015). "In a workers'
compensation case, the [A]ppellate [P]anel is the ultimate fact-finder." Id. at 384,
769 S.E.2d at 3. "Workers' compensation law is to be liberally construed in favor
of coverage in order to serve the beneficent purpose of the Workers' Compensation
Act; only exceptions and restrictions on coverage are to be strictly construed." Id.
at 385, 769 S.E.2d at 3.

V. Archway's Jurisdictional Argument

Archway argues the Single Commissioner in this case sat in an unlawful appellate
capacity by ruling on issues material to Winfrey's initial appeal, and therefore,
lacked jurisdiction because the Appellate Panel had not yet heard Winfrey's appeal
from Commissioner Beck's order. By refusing to find a specific date on which
Winfrey's myocardial infarction occurred, Archway asserts the Single
Commissioner either implicitly affirmed Commissioner Beck's order finding the
heart attack occurred on May 28, 2013, or reversed Commissioner Beck's finding
as to the date of the heart attack. Archway contends the Appellate Panel's decision
and order should be vacated in its entirety because the underlying hearing should
not have been held because the Single Commissioner sat in an unlawful appellate
capacity, and therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the matter. We disagree.

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 through -400 (2005 & Supp. 2016).
"All questions arising under this title, if not settled by agreement of the parties
interested therein with the approval of the commission, shall be determined by the
commission. . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 42-3-180 (2015). "In determining whether a
work-related injury is compensable, the Workers' Compensation Act is liberally
construed toward providing coverage and any reasonable doubt as to the
construction of the Act will be resolved in favor of coverage." Whigham v.
Jackson Dawson Commc'ns, 410 S.C. 131, 135, 763 S.E.2d 420, 422 (2014).

We find the Single Commissioner had jurisdiction and did not sit in an improper
appellate posture by ruling on material issues of compensability. Commissioner
Beck's decision and order was issued after Winfrey's Form 15, Section III, request
for a hearing. The issues before Commissioner Beck concerned whether
Appellants conducted a good faith investigation prior to denying Winfrey coverage
as required by section 42-9-260 of the South Carolina Code (2015). Winfrey
commenced this present action by filing a Form 50 with the Commission, alleging
he suffered a compensable injury under the Act. Therefore, we find the two
actions were separate and distinct, and the Single Commissioner in this case had
jurisdiction and did not sit in an improper appellate capacity.

VI. Date of the Myocardial Infarction

Archway claims the Appellate Panel's decision and order is speculative, conjecture,
and without evidentiary support because the Appellate Panel failed to find a
specific date of when Winfrey suffered his acute myocardial infarction. Archway
asserts the Appellate Panel was required to make findings of fact based on the
evidence of when the acute myocardial infarction occurred and that the acute
myocardial infarction was caused by the electrical shock. Absent these findings,
Archway asserts the Appellate Panel cannot make a finding the ventricular septal
defect is a compensable injury. We disagree.

The Appellate Panel was ultimately tasked with finding whether Winfrey's various
maladies resulted from an injury by accident occurring in the course of his
employment. This is an evidentiary question. We review the Appellate Panel's
determinations to ensure they are supported by substantial evidence. See
Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 610–11 (Under the APA, this court's
review is limited to deciding whether the Appellate Panel's decision is unsupported
by substantial evidence or is controlled by an error of law.).
The Appellate Panel found Winfrey suffered an accident during the course of his
employment on May 22, 2013. Archway does not dispute this occurrence. The
Appellate Panel found this accident ultimately led to a myocardial infarction and
subsequent ventricular septal defect. We find substantial evidence supports this
finding.

Archway contends Winfrey's ventricular septal defect cannot be found to be
compensable under the Act absent a finding of the specific date on which Winfrey
suffered his myocardial infarction. Such a specific finding is not required. What is
necessary is a finding that Winfrey suffered an accident resulting in injury during
the course of employment. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (2015) (stating
"'[i]njury' and 'personal injury' mean only injury by accident arising out of and in
the court of employment"). Archway has not disputed Winfrey suffered an
electrical shock during the course of his employment. Three doctors have opined
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the electrical shock Winfrey
suffered caused the heart attack. Like the Appellate Panel, we find the written
opinion and deposition testimony of Dr. Travis, the treating cardiovascular
surgeon, to be particularly persuasive. Dr. Travis's written opinion states "I find it
quite unbelievable that [Winfrey's] surgery and postoperative course have been
considered separate from his electrical injury at work. I see almost no other
plausible explanation other than a direct cause and effect." During the course of
his deposition, Dr. Travis was asked, "I believe that you've issued a questionnaire
in this case, you've indicated that [Winfrey's] condition was brought about by
electrical shock of 480 volts is that correct?" Dr. Travis replied, "I believe it,
absolutely, had cause (sic) the defect on this presentation." Later in his deposition,
the following exchange took place:

[Archway:] In the medical reports I believe in the post
surgical report you talked about seeing, I guess white
marks on either other side of the heart.

[Dr. Travis:] Correct

[Archway:] What, I think your opinion was, that
probably caused or most likely caused by an electrical
shock entering and exiting the heart, is that correct?

[Dr. Travis:] Correct
[Archway:] Have you've [sic] seen anything like that in
your career prior to that point?

[Dr. Travis:] Not with the heart, I've certainly seen
electrical injuries, when I took care of burn patients, you
would see people that were burn [sic] electrically and you
would see the type of changes as it entered or exited the
extremity which is more common. I've never seen it on a
heart, I've never seen anything that looked liked [sic] that
on the heart.

[Archway:] Okay

[Dr. Travis:] That's what made me think this was related
to his electrical injury, certainly, looked like a [sic] entry,
exit wound. It's shriveled, drawn up, kind of welded
together around the tissues around it, so I have seen it in
other locations, I've never seen it in the heart.

[Archway:] Would the electricity if that -- if those marks
are indicative of that, would that electricity, I guess,
going through the heart had [sic] caused any issues other
than it may have led to the infarction itself?

[Dr. Travis:] It could of rupture [sic] the plaque led to the
infarction. I don’t think it was directly related to the -- I
don’t think it made a hole in the heart

[Archway:] Okay

[Dr. Travis:] I think the hole in the heart came from the
infarction you know muscle dying over time and the hole
developing. I do think it could relate to any electrical
disturbance in the heart and ventricular function.

[Archway:] Okay

[Dr. Travis:] Those are the things that it could effect.
Accordingly, we find the evidence in the record substantially supports the
Appellate Panel's conclusion that Winfrey's myocardial infarction was caused by
the electrical shock he suffered during the course of his employment. Because the
record supports a finding that the electrical shock caused the heart attack, it was
not necessary for the Appellate Panel to find the specific date on which the heart
attack occurred. However, we find it was necessary for the Appellate Panel to hold
that Winfrey suffered an injury by accident arising during and in the course of his
employment. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (2015) (stating "'[i]njury' and
'personal injury' mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment"). We find this is exactly what the Appellate Panel did.

VII. Cause of the Plaque Rupture

Archway contends the Appellate Panel erred in failing to find what caused the
plaque rupture in Winfrey's heart. Archway argues Winfrey's ventricular septal
defect could only be compensable if it was caused by the plaque rupture and the
plaque rupture was caused by the electrical shock. Archway posits an award of
compensability as to the ventricular septal defect absent a finding as to what
caused the plaque rupture in relation to the electrical shock is an award based on
surmise, conjecture, and lacking in evidentiary support. We disagree.

We find the Appellate Panel committed no error in failing to find whether
Winfrey's plaque rupture was caused by the electrical shock. The Appellate Panel
found Winfrey suffered an electrical shock during the course of his employment
resulting in a myocardial infarction that caused a ventricular septal defect. As
discussed above, we find that ruling to be supported by substantial evidence.

We view the Appellate Panel's finding to encompass Winfrey's plaque rupture. See
Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 610–11 (stating that under the APA,
"[t]his [c]ourt's review is limited to deciding whether the [Appellate Panel]'s
decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by some error of
law"). Three physicians opined Winfrey's myocardial infarction and attendant
ventricular septal defect were caused by the electrical shock he suffered while
working on a rotisserie oven during the course of his employment. Dr. Lide
admitted during his deposition testimony he could not say definitively whether the
electrical shock caused the plaque rupture because modern medicine has been
unable to establish what causes a plaque rupture to an absolute certainty.
However, Dr. Lide repeatedly stood by his opinion that all of Winfrey's ailments he
observed to that point were caused by the electrical shock. Clearly, this opinion
encompasses the plaque rupture.

Further, during his deposition Dr. Travis opined that the plaque rupture,
myocardial infarction, and ventricular septal defect were all more likely than not
causally related to the electrical shock Winfrey suffered during the course of his
employment. Like the Appellate Panel, we find Dr. Travis's deposition testimony
and written opinion to be especially compelling given the fact he was the treating
cardiovascular surgeon and physically held and observed Winfrey's heart.

Additionally, we recognize the Appellate Panel explicitly stated "[a]ll of the
submissions to the Single Commissioner were reviewed, including the testimony
presented at the hearing; medical opinions and records; and depositions of
[Winfrey], Dr. Lanneau Lide, Dr. Karen Greenfield, Dr. Barry Feldman and Dr.
Jeffery Travis." Further, we note the Appellate Panel listed Dr. Feldman's beliefs
with regard to the plaque rupture amongst the reasons the Appellate Panel gave
greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Lide and Dr. Travis. We recognize that
questions regarding weight of the evidence are exclusively within the province of
the Appellate Panel. See Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("The final
determination of . . . the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the
Appellate Panel."). Further, Appellate Panel factual findings are conclusive when
there is conflicting evidence. Id. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("Whe[n] there are
conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings of the Appellate Panel
are conclusive."). All of this leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the
Appellate Panel fully considered the evidence with respect to the plaque rupture
and implicitly found the electrical shock caused the plaque rupture by finding the
electrical shock caused the myocardial infarction and ventricular septal defect.

VIII. Appellate Panel's Failure to Find a Specific Date on which Winfrey
Suffered a Plaque Rupture in His Heart

Archway alleges the Appellate Panel erred in finding Winfrey suffered a heart
attack sometime between suffering the electrical shock at work on May 22, 2013,
and presenting to Doctors Care on May 28, 2013. Archway asserts the key to
determining whether Winfrey's ventricular septal defect is compensable is
determining whether the plaque rupture was caused by the electrical shock.
Archway states the Appellate Panel must find a date on which the plaque rupture
occurred in order to find the plaque rupture was caused by the electrical shock.
Archway argues the Appellate Panel's decision and order is speculative, conjecture,
and without any evidentiary support absent a specific finding of when Winfrey
suffered the plaque rupture. We disagree.

The Appellate Panel was charged with finding whether Winfrey suffered an injury
by accident arising during and in the course of his employment. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (stating "'[i]njury' and 'personal injury' mean only injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment"). As discussed above
repeatedly, the Appellate Panel's decision finding Winfrey suffered a compensable
injury is supported by substantial evidence. See Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 289, 599
S.E.2d at 610–11 (finding under the APA, this court's review is limited to deciding
whether the Appellate Panel's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is
controlled by an error of law). Winfrey held the burden of proving he suffered a
compensable injury by establishing causation between the accident suffered at
work and the resulting injury. See Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc., 376 S.C. 338, 349, 656
S.E.2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The claimant has the burden of proving facts
sufficient to allow recovery under the Act."). The three treating physicians each
gave opinions to the best of their medical knowledge that Winfrey's ailments were
causally related to electrical shock he suffered during the course of his
employment. The Appellate Panel found this sufficiently established that Winfrey
suffered a compensable injury under the Act. As we have repeatedly stated, we
find the Appellate Panel's decision and order to be supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, Winfrey has met his burden of proving a compensable injury,
and the exact date of the plaque rupture is only ancillary to that conclusion.

IX. Appellate Panel's Reliance on Dr. Travis's Written Medical Opinion

Archway argues the Appellate Panel erred in relying on Dr. Travis's written
medical opinion for two reasons: (1) Dr. Travis's opinion that the electrical shock
caused Winfrey's heart condition is based solely on the sequence of events between
the shock and the acute myocardial infarction as well as the presence of plaque on
Winfrey's heart; and (2) Dr. Travis's opinion is based on the fact Winfrey was
shocked by 480 volts of electricity which is clearly contradicted by the evidence.
Archway contends the Appellate Panel erred in not properly considering all
evidence and reaching an incorrect conclusion in light of the full evidence.
Archway argues Dr. Travis's written opinions do not establish a clear causal
connection between the electrical shock and Winfrey's heart attack when read in
conjunction with his deposition testimony. We disagree.
We find the Appellate Panel's reliance on Dr. Travis's testimony to simply be a
determination on the weight to be given to evidence. Such a determination is
exclusively within the province of the Appellate Panel. See Hargrove, 360 S.C. at
289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("The final determination of . . . the weight to be accorded
evidence is reserved to the Appellate Panel."). Further, we find Archway's
contention that Dr. Travis's opinion is based on the fact Winfrey was shocked by
480 volts of electricity is contradicted by the evidence to be correct in theory but
unfounded in law. It is true that Dr. Travis admitted in his deposition testimony he
had no way of knowing the actual voltage and simply relied on Winfrey's
representation in reaching his conclusion. However, Winfrey testified at the
hearing he believed he suffered a shock of 240 to 480 volts. Archway presented no
evidence to rebut Winfrey's estimation. Specifically, the Appellate Panel found:

In the mechanics of the accident, [Winfrey] was shocked
with 240-480 volts of electricity; [Winfrey] believed the
actual voltage was 480 volts. [Archway's] witness
admitted at the hearing that he was unsure of the voltage
amount involved, and [Archway] did not present any
evidence to rebut [Winfrey's] estimation even though
Employer had access to the rotisserie in question. The
fact that [Archway] did not present any specific evidence
leads us to rely on [Winfrey's] estimation.

We acknowledge the evidence as to the actual voltage which struck Winfrey was
conflicting. However, Appellate Panel findings with respect to conflicting
evidence are conclusive. See Hargrove at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("Whe[n] there
are conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings of the Appellate
Panel are conclusive."). Therefore, we are bound by the finding that Winfrey was
struck by 480 volts of electricity. Accordingly, we find the Appellate Panel
committed no error in relying on Dr. Travis's written medical opinion.

X. Appellate Panel's Reliance on Dr. Lide's Written Medical Opinion

Archway advances the same arguments against the Appellate Panel's reliance on
Dr. Travis's written medical opinion as against the Appellate Panel's reliance on
Dr. Lide's written medical opinion. For the same reasons discussed in Section IX
above, we find no error in the Appellate Panel's reliance on Dr. Lide's written
medical opinion.
XI. Appellate Panel's Reliance on Dr. Greenfield's Written Medical
Opinion

The same arguments Archway advanced against the Appellate Panel's reliance on
Dr. Travis's and Dr. Lide's written medical opinions are advanced against the
Appellate Panel's reliance on Dr. Greenfield's written medical opinion. For the
same reasons discussed in Section IX above, we find no error in the Appellate
Panel's reliance on Dr. Greenfield's written medical opinion.

XII. Appellate Panel's Finding of Fact Winfrey Began Sweating the Night of
the Attack

Archway asserts the medical and testimonial evidence do not support a finding that
Winfrey began sweating the night of the electrical shock. Archway points to the
fact Winfrey testified he began sweating the morning after the electrical shock to
support their argument. Archway contends the Appellate Panel relied on this
Finding of Fact in finding the heart condition, chest injury, or both compensable.
Archway asks this court to remand this case to the Single Commissioner for a
finding not inconsistent with the evidence and entry of a denial of compensability
for the chest injury, heart condition, or both.

Winfrey testified before the Single Commissioner during the Form 50 hearing "the
next morning when I got up, I was just dripping sweat." The Single Commissioner
stated in the decision and order she found Winfrey to be "very credible." The
Appellate Panel found "[Winfrey] began sweating the same night of the Thursday
accident and also the next morning." Any questions regarding Winfrey's testimony
are simply matters of weight and credibility, which should be left to the ultimate
fact finder. See Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("The final
determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is
reserved to the Appellate Panel."). We recognize Winfrey's testimony can
reasonably be construed to imply he began sweating during the night and awoke
drenched in sweat. We acknowledge the testimony could be read differently;
however, we note it is not our place to override the Appellate Panel on this matter.
See id. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("Whe[n] there are conflicts in the evidence over
a factual issue, the findings of the Appellate Panel are conclusive.").

XIII. Appellate Panel's Finding of Fact that Three Physicians Opined the
Electrical Shock Resulted in Winfrey's Heart Attack Regardless of the
Date on which the Heart Attack Occurred
Archway asserts the doctors' opinions and the Appellate Panel's findings of fact
can essentially be boiled down to a finding that because B happened after A, A
caused B. Archway argues this is simply insufficient to support a finding of
compensability under the act. Archway claims the Appellant Panel had to find
Winfrey suffered his heart attack on a specific date to find it was caused by the
electrical shock and was therefore compensable. We find the Appellate Panel's
findings with respect to this matter to be supported by substantial evidence.
Further, any questions regarding the logical consistency of the doctors' conclusions
are simply matters concerning the weight of the evidence, which—as we have
noted—is exclusively within the province of the Appellate Panel. See Hargrove,
360 S.C. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("The final determination of witness credibility
and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Appellate Panel.").

XIV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Panel's decision and order is

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.