Thompson v. SCDPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Thomas Thompson, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000781

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-274
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed July 5, 2017

AFFIRMED

Thomas Thompson, pro se.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of the South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Thomas Thompson appeals the Administrative Law Court's
(ALC), summary dismissal of his appeal. Thompson argues the South Carolina
Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (1) erred by basing its
decision on an incomplete and inaccurate record, which rendered its decision
arbitrary and capricious; (2) erred by continuing to apply the 1986 Omnibus
Criminal Justice Improvement Act in violation of the ex post facto law; (3)
violated his right to equal protection by denying him parole for a longer period of
time than other persons similarly situated; and (4) erred by negating the sentencing
authority of the plea court by denying him parole in light of the fact the plea
sentence contemplated the possibility of parole based on his behavior while
incarcerated. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2016) (providing the ALC "shall
not hear . . . an appeal involving the denial of parole to a potentially eligible inmate
by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services"); Sullivan v. S.C.
Dep't of Corr., 355 S.C. 437, 443, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2003) ("[T]he permanent
denial of parole eligibility implicates a liberty interest sufficient to require at least
minimal due process, and, therefore, review by the AL[C]."); Cooper v. S.C. Dep't
of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 377 S.C. 489, 498, 661 S.E.2d 106, 111 (2008)
("[A] sufficient liberty interest may be implicated to trigger due process
requirements even though the [Board's] decision did not constitute a permanent
denial of parole eligibility."); id. at 496, 661 S.E.2d at 110 ("Parole is a privilege,
not a right."); Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C.
476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (stating if the parole board "clearly states in
its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640
[of the South Carolina Code] and the fifteen factors published in [its parole
form] . . . the decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC will
have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board
followed proper procedure"); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261, 531 S.E.2d 507,
509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law
retroactively alters the definition of a crime or increases the punishment for a
crime."); id. ("Regarding the issue of increase of punishment, the relevant inquiry
is whether the legislative amendment 'produces a sufficient risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.'" (quoting Cal. Dep't of
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995))); id. ("If the amendment produces
only a 'speculative and attenuated possibility' of increasing an inmate's punishment,
then there is no ex post facto violation." (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 509)).

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.