Lash v. Seneca Police Department

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lloyd Lash, Appellant,

v.

Seneca Police Department, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002296

Appeal From Oconee County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-314
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed July 26, 2017

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Blume Norris &
Franklin-Best LLC, of Columbia; and E. Charles Grose,
Jr., of Grose Law Firm, of Greenwood, both for
Appellant.

James D. Jolly, Jr. and Stacey Todd Coffee, both of
Logan Jolly & Smith, LLP, of Anderson, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399 S.C. 483, 490, 732 S.E.2d 205,
208-09 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment
motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule
56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.");
Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 435, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006) ("[T]o
maintain an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the
institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance
of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice
in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury
or damage." (quoting Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143
S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965))); id. ("An action for malicious prosecution fails if the
plaintiff cannot prove each of the required elements by a preponderance of the
evidence, including malice and lack of probable cause."); id. at 436, 629 S.E.2d at
649 ("Probable cause means 'the extent of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor that the person charged was guilty of a crime for which he has been
charged . . . .'" (quoting Parrott, 246 S.C. at 322, 143 S.E.2d at 609)); id. at 436-37,
629 S.E.2d at 649 (holding in an action for malicious prosecution, a true bill of
indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause).

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.