State v. Cervantes-Pavon

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dennis Elvin Cervantes-Pavon, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002472

Appeal From Charleston County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-258
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed June 28, 2017

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant
Attorney General Susannah Rawl Cole, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, all for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-420(A) (2015) ("It is the intent of the General
Assembly to codify the common law Castle Doctrine which recognizes that a
person's home is his castle and to extend the doctrine to include an occupied
vehicle and the person's place of business."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C)
(2015) ("A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked
in another place where he has a right to be, including, but not limited to, his place
of business, has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground and meet
force with force, including deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is necessary to
prevent death or great bodily injury to himself . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-
450(A) (2015) ("A person who uses deadly force as permitted by the provisions of
this article or another applicable provision of law is justified in using deadly force
and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of deadly
force . . . ."); State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 370, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013) ("A
claim of immunity under the [Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act)]
requires a pretrial determination using a preponderance of the evidence standard,
which this court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard of review."); State
v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016) ("An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded
in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support."); Curry, 406 S.C. at 371,
752 S.E.2d at 266 ("Consistent with the Castle Doctrine and the text of the Act, a
valid case of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must necessarily consider
the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant's entitlement to the Act's
immunity. This includes all elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat.");
State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 318, 768 S.E.2d 232, 238-39 (Ct. App. 2014)
(providing the elements of self-defense save the duty to retreat are (1) the
defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) the defendant
must believe he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury or actually be
in such imminent danger; and (3) the defendant's fear must be reasonable); Curry,
406 S.C. at 372, 752 S.E.2d at 267 ("While the Act may be considered 'offensive'
in the sense that the immunity operates as a bar to prosecution, such immunity is
predicated on an accused demonstrating the elements of self-defense to the
satisfaction of the trial court by the preponderance of the evidence.").

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.