Spanish Wells v. Luckenbill

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Spanish Wells Investments, LLC, Respondent,

v.

Greg Luckenbill and Evelyn Luckenbill, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000592

Appeal From Beaufort County
Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-112
Heard January 1, 2017 – Filed March 8, 2017

AFFIRMED

Steven Luther Alexander, of Alexander Law Firm, LLC,
of Pickens, for Appellants.

Russell Pierce Patterson, of Russell P. Patterson PA, of
Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Greg and Evelyn Luckenbill (the Luckenbills) appeal an order
issued by the master-in-equity finding the Luckenbills breached a contract in which
they agreed to purchase a vacant lot from Spanish Wells Investments, LLC
(Spanish Wells). On appeal, the Luckenbills argue the master erred by (1) finding
the Luckenbills in default on the contract, (2) failing to find the contract terminated
on its own because it could not be performed within a reasonable period of time,
and (3) denying the Luckenbills' directed verdict motion. We affirm1 pursuant to
Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the Luckenbills defaulted on the contract: Faulkner v. Millar, 319
S.C. 216, 219, 460 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1995) ("It is well established in this state that
time is not of the essence of a contract to convey land unless made so by its terms
expressly or by implication."); id. ("When the contract does not include a provision
that 'time is of the essence,' the law implies that it is to be done within a reasonable
time."); id. at 220, 460 S.E.2d at 380 ("In equity, strict compliance with time limits
contained in a contract will not ordinarily be enforced, except with regard to option
contracts."); Electro-Lab of Aiken, Inc. v. Sharp. Constr. Co. of Sumter, 357 S.C.
363, 367, 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) ("An action for breach of contract
is an action at law."); id. ("The [master's] findings of fact [in a law case] will not be
disturbed upon appeal unless found to be without evidence which reasonably
supports the [master's] findings.").

2. As to whether the contract terminated on its own because it could not be
performed within a reasonable period of time: Edisto Island Historical Soc'y, Inc.
v. Gregory, 354 S.C. 198, 202, 580 S.E.2d 141, 143 (2003) ("[N]otice of
termination must be given in accordance with the terms of the contract."); Biber v.
Dillingham, 111 S.C. 502, 504, 98 S.E. 798, 799 (1919) (holding the parties' rights
regarding termination of a contract are to be determined by construction of the
terms in the contract regarding its termination rather than technical rules that
would apply in the absence of such terms).

3. As to whether the master should have granted relief to the Luckenbills on their
directed verdict motion: Rule 41(b), SCRCP (allowing the defendant in a nonjury
trial, following presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, to "move for a dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.