Kennedy v. Richland County School District Two

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jeffrey Kennedy, Respondent,

v.

Richland County School District Two, Eric Barnes, and
Chuck Earles, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000613

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-040
Heard November 17, 2016 – Filed January 25, 2017

REVERSED

Thomas Kennedy Barlow and Kathryn Long Mahoney,
both of Childs & Halligan, P.A., of Columbia, for
Appellants.

Thomas Jefferson Goodwyn, Jr. and Rachel Gottlieb
Peavy, both of Goodwyn Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this civil matter, Richland County School District Two (the
District), Eric Barnes, and Chuck Earles (collectively, Appellants) appeal the
circuit court's award of actual and punitive damages to Jeffrey Kennedy in his
defamation claim against them. Appellants contend the circuit court erred in (1)
denying their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV) regarding the defamation claim; (2) denying their motion for
JNOV regarding individual capacity claims under the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act; (3) denying their motion for JNOV regarding punitive damages, or
alternatively, for a new trial absolute or nisi remittitur and affirming the
constitutionality of the punitive damages award; (4) excluding evidence of
Kennedy's alleged theft and termination from a subsequent employer that occurred
during the pendency of the trial; and (5) failing to instruct the jury that no
defamatory communication was made as a result of Kennedy's termination from
the District and Kennedy's termination was not part of his defamation claim. We
reverse.

1. We find the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' motions for directed
verdict and JNOV on Kennedy's defamation claim. Based upon our review of the
record, we find no evidence that either Earles or Barnes was responsible for
disseminating the defamatory e-mail beyond its intended recipients. See RFT
Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322, 331, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171
(2012) ("An appellate court will reverse the [circuit] court's ruling only if no
evidence supports the ruling below."). Because no evidence indicates that either
Earles or Barnes printed or otherwise showed the e-mail to nonsupervisory
employees, the jury could not have properly found that they exceeded the scope of
their qualified privilege. See Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA,
334 S.C. 469, 484, 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) (stating when a qualified privilege
exists, the plaintiff has the burden to show actual malice or that the scope of the
privilege has been exceeded). Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's decision to
deny Appellants' motions for directed verdict and JNOV on Kennedy's defamation
claim.

2. Because our resolution of the prior issue is dispositive, we decline to address
the remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need
not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

REVERSED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.