Magwood v. Cannon

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Eugene Magwood, Appellant,

v.

J. Al Cannon, Jr., in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Charleston County, Inspector Anderson, Inspector
Antonio, Charles Ghent, and South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001977

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-045
Submitted December 1, 2016 – Filed January 25, 2017

AFFIRMED

Jerry Leo Finney, of The Finney Law Firm, Inc., and
Stephanie Ruotolo Fajardo, of The Fajardo Law Firm,
LLC, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

Robin Lilley Jackson and Christopher Thomas Dorsel,
both of Senn Legal, LLC, both of Charleston, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Eugene Magwood appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Charleston County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff J. Al
Cannon, Jr., Inspector Michael Anderson, Inspector Roger Antonio, Special Agent
Charles Ghent, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (collectively
Respondents). Magwood argues the trial court erred by granting Respondents'
motion for summary judgment on the grounds (1) no genuine issue of material fact
existed and (2) Respondents were entitled to immunity under the Tort Claims Act
(the Act).1 We affirm2 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the
ground no genuine issues of material fact existed: Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C.
116, 121-22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011) ("When reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, appellate courts apply the same standard applied by the trial court
pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); id. at 122, 708 S.E.2d at 769 ("Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery
on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party
must prevail as a matter of law."); Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 389-
90, 675 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In determining whether any triable
issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party."); Hedgepath v. AT&T, 348 S.C.
340, 355, 559 S.E.2d 327, 336 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[W]hen plain, palpable, and
indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ, summary
judgment should be granted."); Carolina All. for Fair Emp't v. S.C. Dep't of Labor,
Licensing, & Regulation, 337 S.C. 476, 485, 523 S.E.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999)
("The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact."); id. at 485, 523 S.E.2d at 799-800
("Once the party moving for summary judgment meets this initial burden, the non-
moving party cannot simply rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in the
pleadings."); id. at 485, 523 S.E.2d at 800 ("Rather, the non-moving party must
come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the
ground of immunity under the Act: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (2005) (stating
the purpose of the Act is to "grant the State, its political subdivisions, and
employees, while acting within the scope of official duty, immunity from liability

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (2005 & Supp. 2016).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
and suit for any tort except as waived by [the Act]"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-
60(5) (2005) (explaining a governmental entity is not liable for loss resulting from
"the exercise of discretion or judgment . . . or the performance or failure to perform
any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment of the governmental entity
or employee"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (2005) (explaining a governmental
entity is not liable for loss resulting from "responsibility or duty including but not
limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student,
patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the
responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner"); Etheredge v.
Richland Sch. Dist. One, 341 S.C. 307, 310, 534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000) (defining
gross negligence as "the failure to exercise slight care"); Staubes v. City of Folly
Beach, 331 S.C. 192, 205, 500 S.E.2d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The exceptions
under the Act must be construed liberally in favor of limiting the liability of the
State and its political subdivisions.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF and SHORT, JJ., and MOORE, A.J., concur.