Roberts v. Keel

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Melvin T. Roberts, Appellant,

v.

Mark Keel, Director, South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (SLED) and the State of South Carolina,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001138

Appeal From Florence County
Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-461
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed November 9, 2016

AFFIRMED

Charles Thomas Brooks, III, of Law Office of Charles T.
Brooks, III, of Sumter, for Appellant.

Adam L. Whitsett, of the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, and Senior Assistant Attorney
General T. Parkin C. Hunter, both of Columbia, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Melvin T. Roberts appeals the circuit court's order granting
Respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings in Roberts's declaratory
judgment action. On appeal, Roberts argues the circuit court erred in granting
Respondents' motion because (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding
viable remedies available to Roberts for removal from the South Carolina Sex
Offender Registry and (2) the Sex Offender Registry Laws do not provide an
adequate and complete legal remedy, thereby making equitable relief appropriate.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Rule
12(c), SCRCP ("After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."); Rosenthal v.
Unarco Indus., Inc., 278 S.C. 420, 422, 297 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1982) ("Where the
pleadings are fatally deficient in substance or fail to state a good cause of action in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, judgment on the pleadings is
proper."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-460 (Supp. 2015) ("A person required to register
[on the sex offender registry] is required to register biannually for life." (emphasis
added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430 (E), (F), (G) (2007 & Supp. 2015) (setting
forth three statutory mechanisms by which a person's name may be removed from
the sex offender registry); Key Corp. Capital, Inc. v. Cty. of Beaufort, 373 S.C. 55,
59, 644 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2007) ("If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and
conveys a clear meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and
the court has no right to impose another meaning." (quoting Buist v. Huggins, 367
S.C. 268, 276, 625 S.E.2d 636, 640 (2006))); id. ("[T]his [c]ourt does 'not sit as a
superlegislature to second guess the wisdom or folly of decisions of the General
Assembly.'" (quoting Keyserling v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 83, 86, 470 S.E.2d 100, 101
(1996))); Regions Bank v. Wingard Props., Inc., 394 S.C. 241, 254, 715 S.E.2d
348, 355 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is well known that equity follows the law." (quoting
Smith v. Barr, 375 S.C. 157, 164, 650 S.E.2d 486, 490 (Ct. App. 2007))); id.
("When providing an equitable remedy, the court may not ignore statutes, rules,
and other precedent."); Key Corp. Capital, Inc., 373 S.C. at 61, 644 S.E.2d at 678
("Indeed, a 'court's equitable powers must yield in the face of an unambiguously
worded statute.'" (quoting Santee Cooper Resort, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
298 S.C. 179, 185, 379 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1989))).

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.