CourtListener 10149515•State v. Wilson
Gesamter Gesetzestext
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Elijah Fernandeze Wilson, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2014-001336
Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-223
Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed May 25, 2016
AFFIRMED
James H. Price, III, of James H. Price, III, PA, and J.
Falkner Wilkes, both of Greenville, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jennifer Ellis Roberts, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Elijah Fernandeze Wilson appeals his conviction for first-degree
assault and battery by mob, arguing the trial court erred in (1) refusing to give his
requested jury charge that spontaneous acts are insufficient to establish
premeditated intent and (2) denying his directed verdict motion. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury charge: State
v. Dennis, 402 S.C. 627, 634-35, 742 S.E.2d 21, 25 (Ct. App. 2013) ("In criminal
cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by the
factual findings of the [trial] court unless clearly erroneous."); State v. Brown, 362
S.C. 258, 261, 607 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Generally, the trial [court] is
required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); State v.
Hill, 382 S.C. 360, 368, 675 S.E.2d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If a charge is
substantially correct and covers the law there is no need for reversal."); Brown, 362
S.C. at 262, 607 S.E.2d at 95 ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a
requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant.").
2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motion: State
v. Smith, 352 S.C. 133, 136, 572 S.E.2d 473, 474 (Ct. App. 2002) ("In considering
a motion for directed verdict in a criminal case, all evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the State."); id. ("The trial court is 'concerned with the existence
or non-existence of evidence, not its weight.'" (quoting State v. Pinckney, 339 S.C.
346, 349, 529 S.E.2d 526, 527 (2000))); id. ("Thus, if the State presents direct or
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove guilt, or from
which guilt can be logically deduced, the directed verdict motion is properly
denied.").
AFFIRMED.1
SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
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