Mikals v. House

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Charles R. Mikals and Donna Mikals, Appellants,

v.

Debra House, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000325

Appeal From Beaufort County
Marvin H. Dukes, III, Special Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-415
Submitted June 1, 2015 – Filed August 12, 2015

AFFIRMED

John E. North, Jr., of North & Black, P.C., of Beaufort,
for Appellants.

Joseph Scott Falls, of Falls Legal, LLC, of Charleston,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Charles and Donna Mikals appeal the circuit court's grant of
Debra House's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2), SCRCP. The Mikals argue the circuit court erred by (1) weighing the
evidence instead of resolving disputed jurisdictional facts in their favor, (2)
incorrectly applying the law pertaining to the fairness prong of the due process
analysis for personal jurisdiction, (3) finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over House would be unfair and unreasonable, and (4) not finding House made a
general appearance after she addressed the merits of the case and asked for
affirmative relief in her motion to dismiss. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

1. We find issue one is immaterial to our resolution of the appeal because our
standard of review requires us to consider the complaint, affidavits, and exhibits to
decide the question of personal jurisdiction. See Cribb v. Spatholt, 382 S.C. 490,
496-97, 676 S.E.2d 714, 717-18 (Ct. App. 2009) (summarizing the standard of
review for a case dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP); Springmasters, Inc. v.
D & M Mfg., 303 S.C. 528, 532, 402 S.E.2d 192, 194 (Ct. App. 1991) (addressing
an appeal involving personal jurisdiction and stating "upon our consideration of
the pleadings and evidence, including [the defendant's] affidavit and [exhibits]
introduced at the hearing, we conclude the trial judge ruled correctly" (emphasis
added)).

2. As to issues two and three, we find the circuit court did not err in finding it
lacked personal jurisdiction over House. See Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
363 S.C. 485, 491, 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005) ("The question of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is one which must be resolved upon the
facts of each particular case. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed
unless unsupported by the evidence or influenced by an error of law." (internal
citation omitted)); Power Prods. & Servs. Co. v. Kozma, 379 S.C. 423, 430, 665
S.E.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When a nonresident defendant attacks the
allegations of a complaint based on jurisdiction, the court is not confined to the
allegations of the complaint but may resort to affidavits or other evidence to
determine jurisdiction."); Cockrell, 363 S.C. at 491, 611 S.E.2d at 508 ("At the
pretrial stage, the burden of proving personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is met
by a prima facie showing of jurisdiction either in the complaint or in affidavits.");
id. ("Because South Carolina treats its long-arm statute as coextensive with the due
process clause, the sole question becomes whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would violate due process."); Cribb, 382 S.C. at 500-01, 676 S.E.2d at
720 ("Based on our courts' recent trend of compressing a personal jurisdiction
analysis into a due process assessment only, our sole question is whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process."); Power Prods., 379
S.C. at 431-33, 665 S.E.2d at 664-65 (summarizing the inquiry a court must make
when applying the power and fairness prongs of a due process analysis).
3. As to issue four, we find the circuit court did not err in not finding House
waived her right to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the circuit court. See
Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP (permitting a party to raise the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction in a motion rather than a responsive pleading); Black's Law Dictionary
1482 (10th ed. 2014) (defining affirmative relief as "[t]he relief sought by a
defendant by raising a counterclaim or cross-claim that could have been
maintained independently of the plaintiff's action"); Rule 7, SCRCP (distinguishing
counterclaims presented in an answer from grounds raised in a motion); Rule 7(b),
SCRCP ("An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial in open court with a court reporter present, shall be
made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set
forth the relief or order sought.").

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.