Marshall v. City of Rock Hill

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Robert K. Marshall, Jr. and Donna Chapman Marshall,
Appellants,

v.

City of Rock Hill, South Carolina, a municipal
corporation, Carey F. Smith, in his capacity as City
Manager, and Lori Thomas, in her Capacity as Customer
Services Manager, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212016

Appeal From York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-304
Heard December 8, 2014 – Filed June 24, 2015

AFFIRMED

John Martin Foster, of Rock Hill, for Appellants.

William Mark White and Jeremy Daniel Melville, of
Spencer & Spencer, PA, of Rock Hill, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: The Marshalls appeal the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City of Rock Hill and two of its employees on the
Marshalls' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of their rights to substantive due
process and equal protection. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C.
452, 483, 636 S.E.2d 598, 614 (2006) ("In order to prove a denial of substantive
due process, a party must show that he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of
a cognizable property interest rooted in state law."); id. ("We have held that the
standard for reviewing all substantive due process challenges to state statutes,
including economic and social welfare legislation, is whether the statute bears a
reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest of government."); Denene, Inc. v.
City of Charleston, 359 S.C. 85, 91, 596 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2004) ("Under the
rational basis test, the requirements of equal protection are satisfied when: (1) the
classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be
affected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances
and conditions; and, (3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis.");
McCall v. IKON, 380 S.C. 649, 659-60, 670 S.E.2d 695, 701 (Ct. App. 2008)
(noting the order on appeal comes to the appellate court with a presumption of
correctness and the burden is on appellant to demonstrate reversible error); Harris
v. Campbell, 293 S.C. 85, 87, 358 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting our
court is "obliged to reverse when error is called to our attention, but we are not in
the business of figuring out on our own whether error exists"); Atl. Coast Builders
& Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012)
("[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case."); Wilder Corp. v.
Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."); Chastain v.
Hiltabidle, 381 S.C. 508, 515, 673 S.E.2d 826, 829 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When an
issue is raised to but not ruled upon by the trial court, the issue is preserved for
appeal only if the party raises the same issue in a Rule 59(e)[, SCACR,] motion.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.