Walton v. Bagwell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

John Walton, Respondent,

v.

Mitchell L. Bagwell, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000882

Appeal From Pickens County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-243
Submitted March 1, 2015 – Filed May 6, 2015

AFFIRMED

Kraig Alan Pringle, of Kraig A. Pringle, Attorney at Law,
of Greenville, for Appellant.

Larry C. Brandt, of Larry C. Brandt, P.A., of Walhalla,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Mitchell Bagwell appeals the trial court's order finding he
breached his lease agreement with John Walton and awarding Walton $51,660.00
in damages and attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, Bagwell argues the trial court
erred by (1) finding Bagwell unilaterally breached the contract; (2) disregarding his
arguments for estoppel, misrepresentation, unclean hands, frustration of purpose,
impracticality, and impossibility regarding the lease; (3) finding the use restrictions
clause in the lease was unambiguous and disregarding parol evidence; (4)
miscalculating the damages; and (5) failing to compel arbitration as required in the
lease contract.1 We affirm. 2

1. We find the facts support the trial court's determination that Bagwell
unilaterally breached the contract. See Sapp v. Wheeler, 402 S.C. 502, 507, 741
S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. App. 2013) ("An action for breach of contract seeking money
damages is an action at law."); Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C. 78, 89-90, 594
S.E.2d 485, 491 (Ct. App. 2004) ("'In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried
without a jury, the findings of fact of the [trial court] will not be disturbed upon
appeal unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the [trial
court's] findings."' (quoting Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86,
221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976))). Bagwell admitted he did not perform as the contract
required, and he offered no proof Walton, the only other signatory to the contract,
was involved in allegedly cancelling the contract.

2. We find Bagwell's claim that the trial court improperly disregarded his
arguments for estoppel, misrepresentation, unclean hands, frustration of purpose,
impracticality, and impossibility regarding the lease is not preserved. Although
Bagwell raised these defenses at trial, the trial court issued only a general ruling
that the defenses "are not supported by the evidence and do not afford Defendant a
legal excuse for terminating the [l]ease." This is not sufficient to preserve the issue
for appellate review. See Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448, 460, 535 S.E.2d
438, 444-45 (2000) (stating a "trial [court]'s general ruling is insufficient to
preserve the specific issue for appellate review" and if no Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
motion is filed requesting a ruling on a particular issue, the appellate court may not
address it); Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991)
(requiring that where a party raises an issue to the trial court but the trial court does

1
In his issues on appeal, Bagwell lists a sixth issue, arguing the trial court's
disclosure of a personal relationship with Walton after his direct and cross
examination was improper. However, he does not address this issue in his brief.
Therefore, this issue is abandoned. See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d
486, 497 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding an issue abandoned when it was listed in the
appellant's statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in the brief).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
not rule on it, the party must raise the issue in a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion in
order to preserve it for appeal). As to the argument that the trial court erred in
disregarding his defenses generally, we find the issue abandoned because Bagwell
provides no citation to legal authority or citation to specific testimony that supports
his claim. See Hunt v. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 573, 595 S.E.2d 846, 851
(Ct. App. 2004) ("Issues raised in a brief but not supported by authority are
deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal."); Atl. Coast Builders &
Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 327 n.1, 730 S.E.2d 282, 284 n.1 (2012)
(finding an issue abandoned when the argument in appellant's brief was "purely a
recitation of facts, devoid of any citation to legal authority," resulting in a summary
conclusion); Ellie, Inc., 358 S.C. at 99, 594 S.E.2d at 496 (finding an issue
abandoned where appellants failed to cite any supporting authority for their
position and all arguments were merely conclusory statements).

3. We find the issue of whether the language in the use restrictions clause is
ambiguous and whether the trial court gave proper weight to parol evidence is
irrelevant to the trial court's finding that Bagwell is liable to Walton for breaching
the lease agreement. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not
review issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

4. We find Bagwell's argument that the trial court miscalculated the damages
award is unpreserved. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731,
733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be
preserved for appellate review."); S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of
S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ("Further, it is a litigant's duty
to bring to the court's attention any perceived error, and the failure to do so
amounts to a waiver of the alleged error.").

5. We find the trial court did not err in determining Bagwell waived his right to
enforce arbitration because although he raised arbitration in his answer and in his
closing arguments at trial, he never moved for the court to compel arbitration. See
Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 374 S.C. 122, 126, 647 S.E.2d 249, 251
(Ct. App. 2007) (stating a party may waive its right to enforce arbitration); id. at
127, 647 S.E.2d at 251-52 (stating that "if the parties conduct significant discovery,
then the party seeking arbitration has taken advantage of the judicial system,
prejudice will likely exist, and the law would disfavor arbitration" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 336 S.C. 658, 667-68,
521 S.E.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding the plaintiff waived its right to
enforce the arbitration clause by submitting the dispute to the court and availing
itself of that system for two and one-half years before moving to stay the trial court
action in favor of arbitration).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.