V.E. Amick & Associates v. Cooper

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

V.E. Amick & Associates, LLC, Respondent,

v.

James L. Cooper Jr., Pamela C. Cooper, Palmetto
Environmental Group, Inc., and Ecological Resources,
Inc., Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000209

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-189
Heard September 10, 2014 – Filed April 8, 2015

AFFIRMED

Luke Richard Gleissner, of Gleissner Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Wesley Dickinson Peel, of Bruner Powell Wall &
Mullins, LLC, of Columbia, and Matthew Hydrick
Stabler, of Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton, LLP, of
Raleigh, NC, both for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: James L. Cooper Jr., Pamela C. Cooper, Palmetto Environmental
Group, Inc., and Ecological Resources, Inc. (collectively, Appellants) seek review
of two circuit court orders granting V.E. Amick & Associates, LLC's (Respondent)
motion to strike Appellants' affirmative defenses (one of which is also designated
as a counterclaim), and granting in part Appellants' motion to reconsider.
Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in: (1) finding Appellants' unclean
hands defense is barred by res judicata; (2) using the incorrect standard in
evaluating Respondent's motion to strike; (3) finding Appellants' "intentional
interference with contractual relationships and business relationship" defense is
barred by res judicata; and (4) finding Appellants are precluded from asserting
their compulsory counterclaim for "intentional interference with contractual
relationships and business relationship." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Appellants' unclean hands
defense is barred by res judicata: State v. Freiburger, 366 S.C. 125, 134, 620
S.E.2d 737, 741 (2005) (concluding that an issue is not preserved for appeal where
one ground is raised below and another ground is raised on appeal); Gause v.
Smithers, 403 S.C. 140, 151, 742 S.E.2d 644, 650 (Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that
an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

2. As to whether the circuit court used the correct standard in evaluating
Respondent's motion to strike: Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C.
560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013) ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case
and requires affirmance.").

3. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Appellants' "intentional
interference with contractual relationships and business relationship" defense is
barred by res judicata: Yelsen Land Co. v. State, 397 S.C. 15, 22, 723 S.E.2d 592,
596 (2012) (stating that in the context of res judicata, "the concept of privity rests
not on the relationship between the parties asserting it, but rather on each party's
relationship to the subject matter of the litigation"); Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160,
167, 712 S.E.2d 408, 412 (2011) (explaining that res judicata bars a second suit
where the following elements are proven: (1) identity of parties; (2) identity of
subject matter; and (3) adjudication of the issue in the first suit); Richburg v.
Baughman, 290 S.C. 431, 434, 351 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1986) ("The term 'privy,'
when applied to a judgment or decree, means one so identified in interest with
another that he represents the same legal right.").
4. As to whether Appellants' counterclaim for "intentional interference with
contractual relationships and prospective business relationships" is compulsory:
Rule 13(a), SCRCP ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction."); Crestwood Golf Club, Inc. v.
Potter, 328 S.C. 201, 217, 493 S.E.2d 826, 835 (1997) (explaining that if a
compulsory counterclaim is not raised in the first action, a defendant is precluded
from asserting the claim in a subsequent action); Beach Co. v. Twillman, Ltd., 351
S.C. 56, 62, 566 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2002) ("By definition, a counterclaim is
compulsory only if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
opposing party's claim." (quoting First–Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Hucks, 305
S.C. 296, 298, 408 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1991))).

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS and McDONALD, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.