Koola v. Cambridge Two, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Johnson Koola, Appellant,

v.

Cambridge Two, LLC, Albert V. Estee, Individually,
Cambridge Lakes, LP, Stephen R. Heape, Individually
and as General Partner of Cambridge Lakes, LP,
Cambridge Lakes Apartment Homes, a/k/a Cambridge
Lakes Apartments, LP, a/k/a Cambridge Lakes
Apartment Homes, LP, Classic Properties of Charleston,
Inc., Cambridge Contracting, LP, Trademark Properties,
Inc., Carolina One Charleston Home Team Properties,
LLC, Charleston Home Team, LLC, Carolina One, and
William E. Jenkinson, IV, Individually,

Of whom Cambridge Two, LLC, Albert V. Estee,
Individually, Cambridge Lakes, LP, and Stephen R.
Heape, Individually and as General Partner of Cambridge
Lakes, LP are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000279

Appeal From Charleston County
W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-422
Submitted October 1, 2014 – Filed November 26, 2014
AFFIRMED

William B. Jung, of William B. Jung, Esq., LLC, of Mt.
Pleasant, for Appellant.

Linda Weeks Gangi, of Thompson & Henry, PA, of
Conway, for Respondents Cambridge Lakes, LP and
Stephen R. Heape; and David Jay Parrish, of Nexsen
Pruet, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents Cambridge
Two, LLC and Albert V. Estee.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in concluding the statute of limitations barred
Johnson Koola's claims: Bovain v. Canal Ins., 383 S.C. 100, 105, 678 S.E.2d 422,
424 (2009) (providing a trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law"); id. ("An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment under
the same standard applied by the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (2005) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for an
action upon a liability created by a statute); Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376,
610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005) ("Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date the injured party either knows or should know, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action exists for the wrongful
conduct. The exercise of reasonable diligence means simply that an injured party
must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury
would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some
right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.
The statute of limitations begins to run from this point and not when advice of
counsel is sought or a full-blown theory of recovery developed." (citations
omitted)); Dorman v. Campbell, 331 S.C. 179, 184-85, 500 S.E.2d 786, 789 (Ct.
App. 1998) (providing the injured party does not have to obtain "actual knowledge
of either the potential claim or of the facts giving rise thereto" and it is irrelevant
whether he fully comprehends the extent of the damage); id. at 184, 500 S.E.2d at
789 (stating the date to determine when discovery of an injury should have been
made is an objective rather than subjective question); Rule 3(a), SCRCP (providing
if a complaint is filed but not served within the statute of limitations, then service
must be made within 120 days of filing).1

2. As to whether the trial court applied the proper standard for summary judgment:
Froneberger v. Smith, 406 S.C. 37, 46, 748 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the party moving for summary judgment
meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the
opponent's case, . . . the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.").

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
As to whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of equitable
tolling: Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998)
(holding that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate
review).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.