SCDSS v. Green

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

James Green, Appellant.

In the interest of a minor child under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001935

Appeal From Beaufort County
Tommy B. Edwards, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-331
Submitted August 4, 2014 – Filed September 5, 2014

AFFIRMED

F. Ward Borden, of Jones Simpson & Newton, PA, of
Hilton Head Island, for Appellant.

Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Gregory Michael Galvin, of Galvin Law Group, of
Bluffton, for the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: James Green (Father) appeals the family court's order
terminating his parental rights (TPR) to his minor child (Child). See S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2013). On appeal, Father argues the family court erred
by finding clear and convincing evidence proved (1) Child was in foster care
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and (2) Child was harmed as defined
by section 63-7-20 of the South Carolina Code (2010) while residing in Father's
home, and because of the severity of the harm, it was not reasonably likely the
home could be made safe within twelve months. We affirm.

1. We find that because of the severity of the harm to Child, it is not reasonably
likely Father's home can be made safe within twelve months. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2570(1) (2010) ("The family court may order [TPR] upon a finding . . .
[t]he child[,] . . . while residing in the parent's domicile[,] has been harmed as
defined in [s]ection 63-7-20, and because of the severity or repetition of the abuse
or neglect, it is not reasonably likely that the home can be made safe within twelve
months."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(4)(c) (defining "harm" to include when a
parent "fails to supply the child with adequate . . . health care though financially
able to do so . . . and the failure to do so has caused or presents a substantial risk of
causing physical or mental injury").1

2. We find TPR was in Child's best interest. See Charleston Cnty. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Jackson, 368 S.C. 87, 102, 627 S.E.2d 765, 774 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In TPR
cases, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration."); id. ("The
interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights
conflict." (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010))).

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
Because we find the family court properly ordered TPR based on this ground, we
decline to address the alternative grounds. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010
& Supp. 2013) ("The family court may order [TPR] upon a finding of one or more
of the [statutory grounds]." (emphasis added)); Doe v. Baby Boy Roe, 353 S.C.
576, 581, 578 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Having found one ground on
which the family court properly terminated [the parent]'s parental rights, we need
only determine that [TPR] is in [the child]'s best interest[] to affirm the family
court's termination." (emphasis added)).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.