Diane A. N. v. Amanda S. G.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Diane A. N., Respondent,

v.

Amanda S. G., Appellant,

In the interest of minor children under the age of
eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000562

Appeal From Aiken County
Dale Moore Gable, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-204
Heard May 6, 2014 – Filed May 23, 2014

AFFIRMED

Tanya D. Jeffords, of the Law Office of Tanya D.
Jeffords and Assoc., PC, of Augusta, GA, for Appellant.

Brian Austin Katonak, of the Law Office of Brian
Katonak, PA, of Aiken, for Respondent.

Barbara Grimes, of Aiken, as Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Amanda S. G. appeals the termination of her parental rights
(TPR), arguing the family court erred in: (1) failing to apply the analysis from the
supreme court case of Moore v. Moore,1 (2) ordering TPR without making a
finding Amanda S. G. was unfit pursuant to Moore, and (3) finding it was in the
children's best interests to grant TPR without considering a joint custody
arrangement when the evidence failed to show she was unfit to raise the children.
We affirm.

Before parental rights can be forever terminated, the alleged grounds for the
termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." Charleston Cnty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson, 368 S.C. 87, 95, 627 S.E.2d 765, 770 (Ct. App.
2006). "On appeal, this court may review the record and make its own
determination whether the grounds for termination are supported by clear and
convincing evidence." Id. "[W]hile retaining the authority to make our own
findings of fact, we recognize the superior position of the family court judge in
making credibility determinations." Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d
650, 655 (2011) (footnote omitted). "This degree of deference is especially true in
cases involving the welfare and best interests of a minor child." Ex parte Morris,
367 S.C. 56, 62, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006). "Moreover, consistent with our
constitutional authority for de novo review, an appellant is not relieved of his
burden to demonstrate error in the family court's findings of fact." Id.
"Consequently, the family court's factual findings will be affirmed unless appellant
satisfies this court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of
the [family] court." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "In a TPR case, the
best interest of the child is the paramount consideration." Jackson, 368 S.C. at 95,
627 S.E.2d at 770.

The family court did not err in declining to apply the Moore factors or make a
finding of unfitness pursuant to Moore as alleged in Issues 1 and 2 because Moore
is inapplicable to TPR actions. See Charleston Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. King,
369 S.C. 96, 104, 631 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2006) ("The Moore factors cannot apply in
the termination of parental rights situation because that situation is governed by
statute.").

1
300 S.C. 75, 386 S.E.2d 456 (1989) (establishing four factors the family court
must consider when a biological parent who temporarily relinquishes custody of a
child seeks to reclaim custody).
The family court also did not err in finding TPR was in the children's best interests
as alleged in Issue 3.2 "We exercise great caution in reviewing termination
proceedings and will conclude termination is proper only when the evidence
clearly and convincingly mandates such a result." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Cochran, 364 S.C. 621, 626, 614 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2005). "In cases involving the
termination of parental rights, there exist two, often competing, interests: those of
the parents and those of the child." Id. "However, a child has a fundamental
interest in terminating parental rights if the parent-child relationship inhibits
establishing secure, stable, and continuous relationships found in a home with
proper parental care." Id. "In balancing these interests, the best interest of the child
is paramount to that of the parent." Id. at 626-27, 614 S.E.2d at 645. "Appellate
courts must consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary
concern when determining whether TPR is appropriate." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013).

A review of the record demonstrates Amanda S. G. had no contact with her
children from March 2009 until July 2011. Amanda S. G. provided no evidence
she has supported the children since 2009 aside from buying them Easter baskets,
giving family members money to buy the children Christmas presents, and buying
the children clothes and school supplies on one occasion when she took them to
Alabama. The family court found that since the temporary custody order has been
in place, Amanda S. G. has only visited the children two or three times and has
made less than twenty out of a possible eighty phone calls.

Conversely, the guardian-ad-litem's (the GAL's) report stated Diane A. N. has
taken the children to medical appointments, helped them with their school work,
and assumed other maternal duties. The family court found Diane A. N. has served
in a motherly capacity since 2007. The children refer to Diane A. N. as "mom"
and Amanda S. G. as "Amanda," despite knowing Amanda S. G. is their biological

2
Although Amanda S. G. does not appeal the family court's findings as to the
statutory grounds for TPR, we find two grounds were met. At oral argument,
counsel for Amanda S. G. conceded these two grounds were met. The two grounds
are failure to visit as provided in section 63-7-2570(3) of the South Carolina Code
(2010), and failure to support as provided in section 63-7-2570(4) of the South
Carolina Code (2010).
mother. The children are doing well in school and have expressed a desire not to
return with Amanda S. G. to Alabama.

Amanda S. G. is currently unemployed and lives with a married man who provides
her with support. Amanda S. G. cited finances as a reason she could not visit the
children as often as she wanted, but evidence showed that in 2009 Amanda S. G.
purchased a visa and moved to the Netherlands until September 2010. Considering
these reasons and the entire record on appeal, we hold the family court's findings
are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that TPR is in the children's
best interests.

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.