Bryant-Perreira v. IMSCO

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Claudia Bryant-Perreira, Appellant,

v.

IMSCO/TFE Logistics Group, and Zurich American
Insurance Company, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000358

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-126
Heard March 5, 2014 – Filed March 26, 2014

AFFIRMED

Samuel Darryl Harms, III, of Harms Law Firm, PA, of
Greenville, for Appellant.

Weston Adams, III, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie,
LLC, of Columbia; Amanda Anderson Mellard, of
McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Greenville; and
Helen Faith Hiser, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie,
LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Claudia Bryant-Perreira appeals the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Commission's Appellate Panel's (Appellate Panel) order, arguing
the Appellate Panel erred in finding she did not suffer an injury arising out of and
in the course of her employment. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
the following authorities: Wright v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 314 S.C. 152, 155, 442 S.E.2d
186, 188 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The question of whether an accident arises out of and is
in the course and scope of employment is largely a question of fact for the
[Appellate Panel]."); id. ("Our review of factual issues is limited to whether
substantial evidence supports the decision of the [Appellate Panel]."); Pilgrim v.
Eaton, 391 S.C. 38, 48, 703 S.E.2d 241, 246 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Our courts have
frequently stated that the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove facts which
will bring the injury under the coverage of the Workers' Compensation Act.");
Wright, 314 S.C. at 155, 442 S.E.2d at 188 ("[N]ot every violation of an order
given to a workman will necessarily remove him from the protection of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. . . . 'Certain rules concern the conduct of the
workman within the sphere of his employment, while others limit the sphere itself.
A transgression of the former class leaves the scope of his employment unchanged,
and will not prevent the recovery of compensation, while a transgression of the
latter sort carries the workman outside of the sphere of his employment and
compensation will be denied.'" (quoting Johnson v. Merchants Fertilizer Co., 198
S.C. 373, 378-79, 17 S.E.2d 695, 697-98 (1941)) (emphases omitted)); id. ("When
an employer limits the sphere of employment by specific prohibitions, injuries
incurred while violating these prohibitions are not in the scope of employment and,
therefore, not compensable.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.