Weaver v. Progress Energy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Gary Weaver, BEA Wallenstein, and B.E.A. Wallenstein
Hospice Inter Vivos Trust, Plaintiffs,

Of whom Gary Weaver is the Appellant,

v.

Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., William Johnson, and
John Does 1-20, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2010-151966

Appeal From Dillon County
J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-347
Submitted August 1, 2013 – Filed September 4, 2013

AFFIRMED

Gary Weaver, pro se, of Little Rock.

Mark W. Buyck, III, of Willcox Buyck & Williams, P.A.,
of Florence, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred by imposing Rule 11(a), SCRCP, sanctions
on Weaver and threatening to hold him in criminal contempt if he failed to pay
attorney's fees to Progress Energy: Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 19, 471 S.E.2d
160, 162 (1996) ("The imposition of [Rule 11, SCRCP] sanctions, however, will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion by the lower court.
An abuse of discretion may be found if the conclusions reached by the lower court
are without reasonable factual support." (internal citation omitted)); Rule 11(a),
SCRCP (stating the circuit court may impose appropriate sanctions, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, upon its own initiative); Burns v. Universal Health Servs.
Inc., 340 S.C. 509, 513, 532 S.E.2d 6, 9 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that under Rule
11(a), SCRCP, a party "may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion,
or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments"); Poston v. Poston, 331 S.C.
106, 111, 502 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1998) (indicating a circuit court may threaten a party
with criminal contempt "to preserve the court's authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders").

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding res judicata barred Weaver's
lawsuit against Progress Energy: Pye v. Aycock, 325 S.C. 426, 432, 480 S.E.2d
455, 458 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The doctrine of res judicata bars a litigant from raising
any issues which were adjudicated in the former suit and any issues which might
have been raised in the former suit."); Riedman Corp. v. Greenville Steel
Structures, Inc., 308 S.C. 467, 469, 419 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1992) ("Res judicata also
bars subsequent actions by the same parties when the claims arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence that was the subject of a prior action between those
parties."); Rule 41(b), SCRCP ("Unless the [circuit] court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits." (emphasis added)).

3. As to Weaver's arguments concerning abuse of process: Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(noting an appellate court need not address appellant's remaining issues when its
determination of a prior issue is dispositive); Judy v. Judy, 383 S.C. 1, 10, 677
S.E.2d 213, 218 (Ct. App. 2009) ("We do not reach this issue because our ruling on
the applicability of res judicata disposes of this appeal." (citing Futch, 335 S.C. at
613, 518 S.E.2d at 598)).

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.