Mackenzie Blackmon v. Michelle Blackmon

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mackenzie Corey Blackmon, Appellant,

v.

Michelle Blackmon, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000504

Appeal From Richland County
Monét S. Pincus, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-174
Submitted April 20, 2023 – Filed May 3, 2023

AFFIRMED

Mackenzie Corey Blackmon, of Columbia, pro se.

James Shadd, III, of Shadd Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia
for Respondent.

Paulette Edwards, of Columbia, Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Mackenzie Corey Blackmon (Father) appeals a family court
order granting him a divorce from Michelle Blackmon (Mother) on the ground of
one-year continuous separation and awarding joint physical custody of the parties'
minor child (Child) on a week-to-week schedule with Mother as the primary
custodial parent. On appeal, Father argues (1) the family court erred in refusing to
grant the divorce on the basis of physical cruelty, (2) the family court erred in
awarding primary custody to Mother and setting a week-to-week custody schedule,
and (3) the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) failed to discharge her duties appropriately.
We affirm. 1

1. We hold the family court did not err in finding Father failed to prove he was
entitled to a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty and instead granting a
no-fault divorce on the basis of one-year continuous separation. In particular, we
note the family court found Mother's testimony to be more credible than Father's
and characterized Father's actions in pursuing domestic violence charges against
Mother as "retaliatory." See Stoney v. Stoney, 425 S.C. 47, 62, 819 S.E.2d 201,
209 (Ct. App. 2018) ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court reviews
factual and legal issues de novo."); Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 387, 544
S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001) ("However, this broad scope of review does not require an
appellate court to disregard the factual findings below or ignore the fact that the
trial judge is in the better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.");
Stoney, 425 S.C. at 62, 819 S.E.2d at 209 (explaining appellate courts "will affirm
the decision of the family court unless its decision is controlled by some error of
law or the appellant satisfies the burden of showing the preponderance of the
evidence actually supports contrary factual findings by th[e appellate] court"); S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-3-10 (2014) ("No divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be
granted except upon one or more of the following grounds, to wit . . . physical
cruelty . . . or . . . on the application of either party if and when the husband and
wife have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of one year.");
Gorecki v. Gorecki, 387 S.C. 626, 633, 693 S.E.2d 419, 422 (Ct. App. 2010)
("Physical cruelty is 'actual personal violence, or such a course of physical
treatment as endangers life, limb or health, and renders cohabitation unsafe.'"
(quoting Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 508, 56 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1949))); id.
(explaining "[a] single assault by one spouse upon the other spouse can amount to
physical cruelty," but only if the assault is "life-threatening or . . . indicative of an
intention to do serious bodily harm or of such a degree as to raise a reasonable
apprehension of great bodily harm in the future").

1
Mother filed an initial brief, but did not file a final version. However, we believe
the Record on Appeal contains sufficient grounds for this court to affirm. See Rule
220(c), SCACR ("The appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or
judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal.").
2. We hold the family court did not err in awarding joint custody of Child and
designating Mother as the primary custodian or in continuing the week-to-week
custody schedule as previously ordered. The family court thoroughly analyzed the
statutory best-interest factors set forth in section 63-15-240(B) of the South
Carolina Code (2014). See Stoney, 425 S.C. at 62, 819 S.E.2d at 209 (explaining
that appellate courts review factual and legal conclusions de novo in appeals
from the family court); Rudick v. Rudick, 437 S.C. 270, 274, 878 S.E.2d 686, 688
(2022) ("However, de novo review does not require the [appellate c]ourt to
disregard the family court's factual findings . . . ."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381,
388, 709 S.E.2d 650, 653 (2011) ("The tendency to affirm family court findings of
fact may be traced to . . . the superior position of the trial judge to determine
credibility and the appellant's burden to satisfy the appellate court that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the trial court."); Middleton
v. Johnson, 369 S.C. 585, 594, 633 S.E.2d 162, 167 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating that
"[i]n all child custody cases, the welfare of the child and the child's best interest is
the 'primary, paramount and controlling consideration of the court'" (quoting Cook
v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 140, 245 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1978))); § 63-15-240(B) (listing
seventeen factors for the family court to consider in determining the child's best
interest when issuing or modifying a custody order).
3. We hold Father's argument that the GAL failed to appropriately discharge the
duties outlined in her appointment order is not preserved for this court's review
because he did not object to the GAL's testimony or final report or otherwise raise
the issue of the GAL's conduct to the family court. See Kneece v. Kneece, 296 S.C.
28, 32, 370 S.E.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1988) ("An issue either not presented to the
trial court or not properly preserved by an exception presents no question before us
on appeal.").
AFFIRMED. 2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.