Anthony Williams v. Castine Williams

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Anthony Williams, Respondent,

v.

Castine Elaine Williams, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000547

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Randall E. McGee, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-197
Submitted April 3, 2023 – Filed May 24, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Michael Vincent Laubshire, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Clarissa Warren Joyner, of The Law Firm of Clarissa
Warren Joyner, of Orangeburg, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Castine Williams (Wife) appeals a divorce decree requiring her to
pay rehabilitative alimony to Anthony Williams (Husband) as well as thirty-five
thousand dollars for half of Husband's student loan. Wife presents several arguments
for reversal. We need not deal with all of them, for Wife is correct that the denials
of her post-judgment motions for relief under Rules 59 and 60, SCRCP were affected
by errors of law.
Husband filed a summons and complaint in August 2019. He sought a divorce on
the ground of adultery or, in the alternative, a divorce on the ground of one-year
continuous separation. He further sought equitable distribution of marital property
and equitable apportionment of marital debt.

Husband served Wife with the summons and complaint the same day he filed these
documents with the court in August 2017. Service was perfected by leaving a copy
of the suit papers with Wife's adult daughter at Wife's home. The parties do not
dispute that service was valid.

Husband filed an affidavit of default in September 2019, following Wife's failure to
file an answer within the thirty (30) day period per Rule 17, SCRFC. About two
weeks after filing his affidavit of default, Husband sent Wife notice of a final
hearing. Wife did not receive this notice, though there is no dispute it was served
by its placement in the mail.

Wife's explanation for her non-participation in the early parts of this case was that
she was in the Bahamas assisting her parents from the end of August 2019 to the end
of October 2019. Hurricane Dorian hit the Bahamas shortly after her arrival there.
Though there is no doubt Wife was served with process several days before she
arrived in the Bahamas, Wife claims she was in Boston and on the way to the
Bahamas when Husband served Wife by serving her daughter. Hurricane Dorian
severely damaged the Bahamas. Wife claims she was stranded there until returning,
as noted above, at the end of October 2019.

By that time, the final hearing had already occurred. The divorce decree was filed
in early December 2019. That was roughly a month after Wife arrived back from
the Bahamas. Husband served Wife with the divorce decree by mail a few days
later, but Wife claims her first written notice of the divorce decree occurred when
she was served with the order by a process server at the end of December. Within
ten days, Wife filed for motions for relief under Rules 59 and 60.

The order denying Wife's Rule 59 motion found the motion was not timely because
Wife had been served with the divorce decree by mail in early December. Wife
correctly argues this was error. Rule 59(e) specifies that a motion is timely as long
as it is served within 10 days of the complaining party's "receipt of written notice of
the entry of the order." The date the divorce decree was mailed to Wife does not
control.
On Rule 60, the order cited two cases for the proposition that Rule 60(b)(5)—
allowing relief when a judgment has been satisfied, vacated, or enforcement is no
longer equitable—does not give the family court the ability to modify an equitable
distribution award. We do not dispute that point of law, but this divorce decree did
not contain an equitable distribution award, 1 and other cases recognize that a party
seeking relief from a default judgment must do so under Rule 60. Sundown
Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 608, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009);
see also Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605, 611, 848 S.E.2d 604, 607 (Ct. App. 2020)
(acknowledging family court's power to consider this common usage of Rule 60);
Winesett v. Winesett, 287 S.C. 332, 334, 338 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1985) (same).

Reversal is mandated by the reasoning given above. Still, we mention the order cited
this Court's opinion in Roesler v. Roesler, 396 S.C. 100, 719 S.E.2d 275 (Ct. App.
2011), in rejecting Wife's argument that it could not conduct a final hearing because
there had not been a mediation. There, a party received an exemption from
mandatory mediation from the chief administrative judge. Id. at 111-12, 719 S.E.2d
at 281. "Good cause" for the exemption in that case included the fact that the wife
was in default and that her whereabouts were unknown. Id. Here, there was no
motion to the chief administrative judge seeking an exemption from mediation, and
Wife appears to claim Husband knew that she was stranded in the Bahamas. We
make no expression on the merits of any factual dispute between the parties,
including whether Husband knew of Wife's location. The point is that Roesler is
meaningfully distinguishable on at least one front (the exemption from the chief
administrative judge) and maybe two (knowledge of the absent party's whereabouts).

For these reasons, we reverse the order denying Wife's motions for relief under Rules
59 and 60. The case is remanded for the motions to be evaluated under the
appropriate standard.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 2

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
Husband's complaint included a claim for equitable distribution, but the divorce
decree specified he "made no property claims."
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.