State v. Torrence

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Andrew Torrence, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-194612

Appeal From Lexington County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-152
Heard March 5, 2013 – Filed April 10, 2013

AFFIRMED

John S. Nichols and Blake A. Hewitt, Bluestein Nichols
Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of Columbia, H. Wayne
Floyd, of West Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Assistant Attorney
General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Andrew Torrence appeals his conviction of voluntary
manslaughter for the shooting death of Zach Chaplin. He argues the circuit court
erred when it did not charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter because there is
evidence in the record showing Torrence did not intend to inflict great bodily harm
or death. We affirm.

In the early morning hours of September 28, 2008, Torrence and Chaplin got into a
physical altercation while at a bar. Although Torrence initially exited the bar after
the fight, he decided to go back in with his gun to make a citizen's arrest and detain
Chaplin for the earlier assault. He testified he brought the gun with him as a
deterrent against any further violence and had no intent to shoot the gun.
However, while Torrence was conducting the alleged citizen's arrest, Chaplin
charged him from across the bar. Torrence admitted he fired the gun twice at
Chaplin. Both bullets struck Chaplin, and he died from complications of his
injuries.

At trial for murder, the court charged voluntary manslaughter but refused
Torrence's request to charge involuntary manslaughter. The jury found Torrence
guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and the court sentenced him to twenty-five years
imprisonment.

The law to be charged is determined from the evidence presented at trial. State v.
Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 355, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 2010). The trial court
commits reversible error if it refuses a request for a jury instruction on a lesser-
included offense that is supported by the evidence. 390 S.C. at 355-56, 701 S.E.2d
at 770.

Involuntary manslaughter is defined as the unintentional killing of another without
malice while (1) engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause
death or great bodily harm or (2) engaged in a lawful activity with reckless
disregard for the safety of others. State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 414, 706 S.E.2d 12,
15 (2011). Generally, a charge of involuntary manslaughter is inappropriate where
the defendant admits he or she intentionally fired a gun. See State v. Pickens, 320
S.C. 528, 531-32, 466 S.E.2d 364, 366-67 (1996) (holding defendant not entitled to
involuntary manslaughter charge because defendant admitted intentionally
shooting the gun); Gibson, 390 S.C. at 357-58, 701 S.E.2d at 771-72 (holding
defendant not entitled to charge of involuntary manslaughter because "the essence
of involuntary manslaughter is the involuntary nature of the killing" and he
intentionally fired the gun); State v. Morris, 307 S.C. 480, 484, 415 S.E.2d 819,
821-22 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant not entitled to involuntary
manslaughter charge because the act must be unintentional and defendant
intentionally fired the gun).
We reject Torrence's argument that the word "unintentional" in the involuntary
manslaughter definition should mean the defendant's intent to cause the
consequence of death or serious bodily harm when he fired the gun. Instead, we
consider the word "unintentional" to relate to the defendant's intent to voluntarily
fire the gun. See Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 177, 414 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1992)
(explaining involuntary manslaughter charge inappropriate even though defendant
"only meant to shoot over the victim's head" because he intended to shoot the gun).
Therefore, because there is no evidence that Torrence did not intentionally fire his
gun at Chaplin, he was not entitled to a charge of involuntary manslaughter.
Moreover, this case does not fall under either prong of the involuntary
manslaughter definition because: (1) firing a gun is considered conduct naturally
tending to cause death or great bodily harm; and (2) Torrence was not acting
lawfully by brandishing the gun in a bar. See id. 307 S.C. at 177, 414 S.E.2d at
147 (observing that firing a gun "naturally tends to cause death or bodily harm");
State v. Rivera, 389 S.C. 399, 403, 699 S.E.2d 157, 159 (2010) (agreeing with
State's argument that brandishing a weapon was unlawful conduct naturally
tending to cause death or great bodily harm); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-465 (2003)
(unlawful to carry a firearm onto the premises of a building selling alcoholic
liquors).

Torrence cites cases from North Carolina in support of his claim that the facts
warrant a charge of involuntary manslaughter. However, we must analyze this
case under the law as it currently exists in South Carolina. Under South Carolina
law, the facts of this case require us to find that a charge of involuntary
manslaughter was not supported by the evidence. Therefore, the circuit court's
refusal to charge involuntary manslaughter is

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.