State v. Patterson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Eugene D. Patterson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2008-090626

Appeal From Richland County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-154
Heard April 1, 2013 – Filed April 17, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney
General Melody Jane Brown, and Solicitor Warren B.
Giese, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Eugene Patterson appeals his conviction for murder, arguing the
trial judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because
the State's evidence against him was too insubstantial to rise above a mere
suspicion that he was guilty. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 97, 544 S.E.2d 30, 36
(2001) (stating the trial court is concerned with the existence of evidence rather
than its weight when considering a directed verdict motion); State v. Cherry, 361
S.C. 588, 594, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("[A] trial judge is not required to find
that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis.");
State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 322, 555 S.E.2d 402, 405 (2001) ("When a
directed verdict motion is made in a criminal case where the State relies
exclusively on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge must submit the case to the
jury if there is any substantial circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to
prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically
deduced."); State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 542, 713 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2011) (noting
if there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to
prove the guilt of the accused, this court must find the case was properly submitted
to the jury); id. ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court
views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
State."); State v. Miller, 397 S.C. 630, 635, 725 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Ct. App. 2012)
("South Carolina law defines 'murder' as 'the killing of any person with malice
aforethought, either express or implied.'" (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10
(2003))); State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 276, 584 S.E.2d 138, 141-42 (Ct. App.
2003) ("Malice is the wrongful intent to injure another and indicates a wicked or
depraved spirit intent on doing wrong."); id. at 276-77, 584 S.E.2d at 142 ("Implied
malice is when circumstances demonstrate a 'wanton or reckless disregard for
human life' or 'a reasonably prudent man would have known that according to
common experience there was a plain and strong likelihood that death would
follow the contemplated act.''' (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 35 (1991))); id. at
276, 584 S.E.2d at 142 ("In its legal sense, [malice] does not necessarily 'import ill-
will toward the individual injured, but signifies rather a general malignant
recklessness of the lives and safety of others, or a condition of the mind which
shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief.'" (quoting
State v. Heyward, 197 S.C. 371, 375, 15 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1941))); id. at 277, 584
S.E.2d at 142 ("The use of a deadly weapon gives rise to a permissive inference of
malice."); State v. Dantonio, 376 S.C. 594, 605, 658 S.E.2d 337, 343 (Ct. App.
2008) ("A defendant's act may be regarded as the proximate cause if it is a
contributing cause of the death of the deceased."); id. ("The defendant's act need
not be the sole cause of the death, provided it is a proximate cause actually
contributing to the death of the deceased."); State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 272,
531 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2000) ("[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder or
manslaughter in a case of bad or mistaken aim under the doctrine of transferred
intent."); Heyward, 197 S.C. at 377, 15 S.E.2d at 672 ("If there was malice in
[defendant's] heart, he was guilty of the crime charged, it matters not whether he
killed his intended victim or a third person through mistake.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.