In the Matter of Fetner

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of William
Bryan Fetner, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-198707

Appeal From Richland County
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-123
Submitted March 1, 2013 – Filed March 27, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: William Bryan Fetner appeals his commitment to the
Department of Mental Health, arguing the circuit court erred when it (1) allowed
the mental health evaluator to testify about the screening procedure that led to her
appointment and (2) instructed the jury improperly concerning reasonable doubt.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the circuit court erred in admitting the screening procedure
testimony: State v. Salley, 398 S.C. 160, 168-69, 727 S.E.2d 740, 744 (2012) ("The
admission or exclusion of evidence is an action within the sound discretion of the
circuit court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.");
id. at 169, 727 S.E.2d at 744 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions
of the circuit court are either controlled by an error of law or are based on
unsupported factual conclusions."); State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336
S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) ("[R]eversal is not required unless appellant was
prejudiced by the error."); State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58
(2011) ("Prejudice occurs when there is reasonable probability the wrongly
admitted evidence influenced the jury's verdict.").

2. As to whether the circuit court instructed the jury improperly concerning
reasonable doubt: State v. Simmons, 384 S.C. 145, 178, 682 S.E.2d 19, 36 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, this Court must consider the
circuit court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented
at trial."); id. ("If, as a whole, the charges are reasonably free from error, isolated
portions which might be misleading do not constitute reversible error."); id. ("A
jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct
definition and adequately covers the law."); id. ("To warrant reversal, a circuit
court's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and
prejudicial to the defendant."); State v. Darby, 324 S.C. 114, 116, 477 S.E.2d 710,
711 (1996) ("Courts specifically addressing whether the 'real possibility' language
lessens the government's burden of proof have held it does not in the context of the
preceding language requiring that the juror be 'firmly convinced' of the defendant's
guilt."); id. ("Further, there is nothing in this language to suggest the defendant
himself bears any burden of proof.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.