SC Self Storage v. City of Aiken

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Self Storage Association and South
Carolina Self Storage Association of Personnel and
Staffing individually and on behalf of themselves the
members and all entities similarly situated, Appellants,

v.

City of Aiken, et al., Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2010-168366

Appeal from Richland County
J. Michelle Childs, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-541
Heard September 11, 2012 – Filed October 3, 2012

AFFIRMED

T. Alexander Beard, of Beard Law Offices, of Mount
Pleasant, A. Camden Lewis and Ariail E. King, both of
Lewis Babcock & Griffin, LLP, of Columbia, for
Appellants.

Danny Calvert Crowe and R. Hawthorne Barrett, both of
Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Columbia, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Respondent municipalities.1 South Carolina Self Storage
Association and South Carolina Association of Personnel and Staffing (collectively
Appellants) contest the following trial court rulings: (1) Appellants lacked
associational standing to bring this appeal; (2) Appellants lacked standing under
the public importance exception; (3) Appellants failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies; and (4) Appellants waived any claims for business license
taxes previously paid pursuant to the voluntary payment doctrine. We affirm the
trial court pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in ruling Appellants did not have standing to
bring these claims: Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of
Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 601, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001) (stating that to
establish standing, the plaintiff must prove (1) an injury in fact, which is
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) it is likely as
opposed to speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision); Georgetown Cnty. League of Women Voters v. Smith Land Co., 393
S.C. 350, 359, 713 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2011) (Hearn, J., dissenting) ("To
supplement the analysis for individual standing . . . the courts of this state have
adopted another three-part test from the United States Supreme Court regarding
the standing of an organization to bring a claim on behalf of its members: (1) its
members would have standing to sue individually; (2) the interests at stake are
germane to the organization's own interests and purpose; and (3) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief sought requires the involvement of individual
members." (citing Beaufort Realty Co. v. Beaufort Cnty., 346 S.C. 298, 301,
551 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ct. App. 2001))); Sea Pines, 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d
at 291 ("The party seeking to establish standing carries the burden of
demonstrating each of the three elements." (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992))).

2. As to whether the trial court erred in ruling Appellants did not meet the
requirements to establish invocation of the public importance exception:
Freemantle v. Preston, 398 S.C. 186, 193, 728 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2012) (stating

1
For purposes of brevity, the eighty-five municipalities that were the defendants in
this case will be collectively referred to as "Respondent municipalities."
that "[t]his [c]ourt has often recognized the 'public importance' exception to the
general standing requirements" when an issue is "'of such public importance as
to require its resolution for future guidance'" (quoting ATC S., Inc. v.
Charleston Cnty., 380 S.C. 191, 198, 669 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2008))); id. at 194,
728 S.E.2d at 44 (stating there is a nexus between the public importance
exception and the need for future guidance from the courts is "invariably linked
to a need for and entitlement to injunctive relief"); see id. (finding that the
appellant's request for monetary damages for himself in addition to his requests
for various declaratory judgments, while claiming to represent the taxpayers of
his county, directly conflicted with the purpose and spirit of the public
importance exception).

3. As to whether the trial court erred in finding the Appellants failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies: Brown v. James, 389 S.C. 41, 54, 697 S.E.2d
604, 611 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The general rule is that administrative remedies
must be exhausted absent circumstances supporting an exception to application
of the general rule." (citing Andrews Bearing Corp. v. Brady, 261 S.C. 533,
536, 201 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1973))); Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424,
438, 629 S.E.2d 642, 650 (2006) (stating that while futility is a general
exception to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it must
be demonstrated by a showing comparable to the administrative agency taking
"a hard and fast position that makes an adverse ruling a certainty." (quoting
Thetford Props. IV Ltd. P'ship v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 907 F.2d
445, 450 (4th Cir. 1990))); Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of
Revenue, 342 S.C. 34, 39, 535 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2000) (finding that "the mere
presence of a constitutional issue does not excuse the exhaustion requirement
where there are other issues in controversy"); Law, 368 S.C. at 438, 629 S.E.2d
at 650 (stating that whether to require the plaintiff to exhaust administrative
remedies is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not
be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion (citing Andrews Bearing
Corp., 261 S.C. at 536, 201 S.E.2d at 243; Tri-County Ice & Fuel Co. v.
Palmetto Ice Co., 303 S.C. 237, 242, 399 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1990))).

4. As to whether the trial court erred in finding the voluntary payment doctrine
precluded the Appellants from challenging previously paid business license
taxes, we decline to reach the merits of the argument. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(stating that if an appellate court's ruling on a particular issue is dispositive of
an appeal, rulings on remaining issues are unnecessary).
AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, AND LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.